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Suaidi Asyari
Ij tihad-Based Politics :
The Muhammadiyah Political
Participation in Post-Soeharto Indonesia*
Abstrak Artikel ini ini berupaya mengelaborasipuan penting politik Mu-
hammadiyah dalam proses demokrstisasi di Indonesia dari perspektif wacana
dan implementasi peran politik berbasis 'ijtihnd' yang dikembangknnnya pasca
runtuhnyakekussaan otoriter Orde Baru. Secarahistoris,ideologis-meskipun
tukndanglebihbersifat supufisial-ijtihndmuupakan salah satufondnsi dasar
yang mendominasi worldaiaa Muhammadiyah. Olehknrena tidak didukung
oleh perangkat dan program pendidiknn yang mumpuni untuk melaksnnakan
ijtihad dalam pengertian sesungguhnya, kosakata ijtihnd belaknngan terlihnt
sudah dimaknai dengan amat longgar di knlangan keluarga besar Muham-
madiyah. Thus,lahirnya wacana dan praktik politik'ijtihad politik Muhnm-
madiyah' atau 'ijtihad politik Amien Rais' adalah bsntuk kongkrit knsat aknl
pelonggaran makna dan praktik ijtihnd itu.
Sejak Muhnmmadiyah didiriknn padn tahun 1912 yang kemudinn diiringi
dengan kalahirsn Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) tahun 1926 dan beberapa organisa-
si sosial ke-Islam-an lainnya yang mempunyai knraktu sama ntrru mirip de-
ngan salah satu keduanya pada priode yang sama, tidnk diragunaknn lagi
umat Islam Indonesis telah terbelah kedalam dua mainstream secara sosio-
ideologr keagamaan, Oleh sebaginn peneliti, muekayang mengikuti atau mirip
dengan cara keagamnan Muhnmmndiyah dikategoriknn sebagai kelompok Muslim
'modunis.' Sedangknn merekn yang mengikuti dnn mirip dengan cara keagam-
san NU dikntegoriknn sebagai kelompok Muslim'tradisionalis.' Sarnpai deknde
1990-an, meskipun ada sejumlah peneliti yang buusaha mengl<ritisi pengelom-
pokan ini, misalnya telah tujadi ouulnpping antars modernis-traditionalis di
tubuh keduanya, namun secara umum keberadnnn kedua kelompok umst Islam
dengan knrakter ini terlalu sulit untuk dibcrntah.
Berawal dnri per ebutnn kekuasann dalam Masyumi, setelah memasuki masa
kemerdekaan, khususnya memasuki deknde 1950-an keberadaan kedua kelom-
pok ini telah maaarnai pusaingan politik umat lslam. Khususny a ketika Nah-
dlatul Ulama memisahkan diri dari Masyumi untuk menjadi Partai Nahdlat-
uI Ulsma pada tahun L952. Fakta dnn data statistik tidakpernah dapat men-
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jastifikasi pusniangan politik nntnr kedusnya dalam pengertian adnnya salah
satu dari kedunnyn yang ffiemenangkan sebunh Pemilhnn Umum, naffLun
dalam kehidupan sehari-hari umttt lsk m, sangat sering kedengaran pertanyann
sep erti " siapa ynng menangT Muhammndiyah atau NU? P tdahnl y ang selalu
unggul adalahbuksn dari salah satu keduanya.
Meskipun Mufutmmadiyah telnh memainkan pernn pentingnyn dalam
percaturan politik di Indonesict sejak ia didiriknn, namun perannya dalam
proses demokrstisasi di Indonesia sejak jatuhnya orde Baru sangat penome-
rutl. HaI yang paling menarik dnri peran yang dimainknn oleh Muhnmmad-
iyah setetah masuknya Ern Reformasi adakth hubungangan timbal-baliknyn
dengan PAN (Partai Amnnnt Nssional) yang didirikan oleh Prof' Dr. H.
Amien Rnis yang padn waktu itu masih menjabat sebagai Ketua Pimpinan
pusat Muhnmmmadiyah. HLl ini terlihht misalanya pada pendirian Pengu-
rus wilayah, Daerah, Cabang sampai tingknt paling rendah dari PAN (Partni
Amanat Nasional) olehpara tokoh dan aktiais Muhammadiyah dengan menS'
gunaknn semangat'ij tihad politik'.
Ketika dalam keluarga besar Muhnmmadiyah masih terdapat aarian yang
tirlnk bisa menerims uoacana membatua Muhnmmadiyah ke wilayah politik
praktis, makn Amien Rais dengan cerdik mengatr*nnbahwa apa yang sedang
dia lakukrm sdalah dalam rangka mempraktekkan apa yang selama ini diden-
gung-dengungknn oleh Muhnmmadiy ah, yaitu sebagai ij tihnd.
Meskipun Muhammadiyah telah memsinknn peran ynng amnt penting
dalam proses demol<r stisasi di lndonesia sejak i atuhnya rezim Or de Baru, akan
tetapi jika dilihnt dari kesenjangan antara impian utnmn para tokoh dan poli-
tisi Muhsmmadiynh, misalnya untuk menduduki jnbntnn Presiden di negeri
ini, mnkfl Muhammadiyah perlu belnjar lebih banyak dari lingkungannya.
Ada kekhnzuatiran yang amat besar dalnm masyarakst Muslim non-Muham-
madiyah di lndonesh bshwct jikn Muhnmmadiyah menguasai pemerintahnn
Indonesia, maka aknn snngat besrtr kemungkinkan Muhammadiyah aknn
melakukan geraknn purifikasi melalui keklwsaan dan kekuatan negara. sep erti
yang ditulis oleh penulis dalam tulisannya yang lain, di uilayah-zuilayah di
luar lawa, sesungguhnya gernknn purifikasi ala wahnbi iauh lebih dominant
ketimbang apa ynng clisebut sebagai gerakan modernis. Nttmun kedua hnl ini
kelihatannya terlihat dinbaiknn oleh Muhnmmadiyah diknrenaknnkustnyn spirit
purifikasinya.
D engan melihat kasus di tiga wilayah, I ambi, Banj armnsin dnn Maknssar,
b ar angkali dap at disar ankan bahw a dttlam rangkn op timnlisasi p er anny a dalam
proses demokratisasi yang sedang berlangsung sant ini, Muhnmmadiyah mu-
ngkin perlu memoderstksn sayap puritannya sehingga petan Muhammad-
iyah dalam proses demokrntisasi di Indonesia lebihbisa diterima oleh Muslim
non-Muhammadiy ah di Indonesin.
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,espite the fact that there are Muslims who believe that Islam
and democracy is not compatible, there have been many Is-
lamic organizations that have regarded such question should
be put to an end. Islamic organization should use democratic sphere in
order to play a greater role in the society for a better life of Muslims in
the country. One of such Islamic organizations is Muhammadiyah.
Fotrnded ln 1912, Muharnmadiyah claims to be the largest puritan-
modemist hlamic organisation not only in lrdonesia but also in the world,
with more than 25 million followers. Originaly Muhammadiyah was
purely a religious organisation. However, after the declaration of Indo-
nesian independence rn1945, particularly after Masy'trmi-of which Mu-
hammadiyahwas one of its specialmembership
a political party, Muhammadiyah has been involved in Indonesian poli-
tics in one way or another. Since it was founded, Muhammadiyah pro-
motes ijtihnd as opposed to ijmn' as in the case of the Nahdlahrl lJlam4
the largest hsdilisnalist Islamic organization founded n1926. Howev-
er, it was after the collapse of New Order regime that Muhammadiyah
started to associate its political role by combining its basis of worldview
that is ijtihadwirhpolitical attitudes of its leaders. Thus, the formation of
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) has been called as a political ijithnd ot
Amien Rais.-one of Muhammadiyah leaders-and the endorsement
of Muhammadiyah to Rais's presidential candidacy in 2004 is called po'
ltncal t1 tihnd of Muhammadiyah.
Despite the fact that Muhammadiyah supported the formation PAN
across Lrdonesia has significant meaning in the ongoing process of
democratization in Lrdonesia, Rais's endeavor to bring Muhammad-
iyah into political sphere has resulted inpros and cons both in Muham-
madiyah community and Indonesian people in general. This political
development of Muhammadiyah raises several questiors; what is so-
cio-religious spirit that drives Muhammadiyah to play a greater role in
Lrdonesian politics; what kind of variants that have been formed as a
result of such pro and cons; and how have such pros and cons within
Muhammadiyah influenced the role of Muhammadiyah in the legisla-
tive and executive elections 2004. in line with those questions, this ar-
ticle attempts to discuss to what extent the role played by Muham-
madiyah contributes to the process of democratizatton in Indonesia?
Ijtihad: From a Religious to a Political Worldview
To examine the role of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's socio-polit-
ical context, including its relationship with the broader community
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of modernist-puritanical Muslims, one should take into account the
religious worldview of this organisation, because it is on this world-
view the organisation's political and religious networks are constructed
and its political force expanded and constantly rejuvenated.
Muhammadiyah's religious-worldview has been based on several
aspects. First and the most common referred to is its advocacy of
ijtihad. Literally, ijtihad is defined as "striving," "exerting," "endeav,
or" or "self-exertion." In the Islamic jurisprudential sense, among its
corrunon definitions is "the maximum effort expended by the jurist to
master and apply the principles and rules of usul al-fiqh (legal theory)
for the purpose of discovering God's law.1 However, there is also
other version of definition of ijtihnd, for example it is defined ""the
capacity for making deductions in matters of law in cases to which no
express text or rule already determined by ijma'(consensus) is appli-
cable."2 Such different definition has played important role in mak-
ing Muslim jurists, scholars and Mr-rslim groups polemically divided.
Mtrlramrnadiyah and NU are par excellence. The first definition and
alike indicates that ijtihnd is an ongoing process of academic quest
without any limitation whatsoever in terms of aspect and time. In
contrast/ the second definition and alike indicates that ijtihad can be
subject to limitation of aspect, coverage and time.3
In Muhammadiyah, ijtihnd is understood to be carried out indi-
vidually or collectively and those who are not capable to do so should
employ ittiba'; that is to accept or to follow fatzaa (religior-rs edict) of
someone with the condition of knowing principles that suchfatwn is
based Llpon.4 In order to exercise ijtihad in Muhammadiyah, it estab-
lished Council of tarjih in 1927 which was mandated "to formulate
theological bases for Muhammadiyah.. .Every idea or theory that have
been agreed up by this council can function as logical or philosophical
justification for programs and other goals of the (Muhammadiyah)
movement"s The initial goal of Council of tarjih is to end the hegemo-
ny of madhhab upon Muslims. However, many people both in Mu-
hammadiyah and outside Muhammadiyah have been concerned that
it has become a new madzhnb, instead.6 It appears that the main cause
of such tendency is due to the fact that the council has been working
merely on religious rituals, such as abiution, ptayer, alms, hajj and
charity.T ln later development, the vocabulary of ijtihad has been used
in forums other than religior-rs one, namely in the realm of politics.
During this Reform Era, Muhammadiyah politicians have often used
this term in order to justify their political behaviors. Thus, they had,
for example, political ijtihnd of Amien Rais when Rais founded PAN
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in 7997 and the 'political ijtihad of Central Axrs lijtihad politik Poros
Tengah] when rnodernist politicians forcefully withdrew Abdurrah-
man Wahid from his power in 2001.8
The second aspect of the basis of Muhammadiyah world view is
taldid.Tajdid (revival, reform), in Muhammadiyah commturity is referred
to the hndith: ""God will send to this community at the tum of every
centuuy one (or: people) who will restore (revive) their religion." (inna
allah yab'ath li-hadhihi al-ulnffin 'ala ra's kulli mi'a sann ffnn yujaddid laha amr
diniha.'According to Syamsul Hidayat, a member of MKSDI and
MTDKl0Central Board of Muhammadiyah, based on this hndith, tojdid n
Muhammadiyah has two operational definitions (i) ptuification; that in-
volves understanding, intemalizing and putting into practice things which
are fixed (al-thmuabit p\. thnbit) in Islam such as the authenticity of the
Qur'an, authentic hadith,Islamic theology, religious rituals,Islamic ethics
and social relation; (ii) modemizattonin things which are subject to con-
ditional change (al-mutaghayyirat), such as the system of organisatiory
developing models of education an so on.11
The third aspect of the basis of Muhammadiyah worldview is the
notion of jihnd. In this regard ijthad is also sometime combined with
jihad fi sabilillah within Muhammadiyah community.l2 lihad literally
means "strive" or "struggle." In the Islamic teaching, the concept of
jihndhas been based on verses of the Qur'an andhadith of the Prophet
Muhammad. Among the verses of the Qur'an are in verses22:78, and
39-40,25:52, and9:20.13In Muhammadiyah, it is acknowledged what
have been spelled put by Muslim juri sts ttnt jihnd as an obligation can
be performed in four ways, (i) by heart, (ii) by tongue, (iii) by the
mind, and (iv) by the sword. However, Muhammadiyah stresses the
importance of giving charity in the path of God.1a Every member of
Mulrammadiyah are encouraged to strive, conducting jihad, for the
shake of happiness for others.1s
In addition, jihnd is also often combined with birr (righteousness/
in Muhammadiyah.l6 This refers to verse 177 of chapter 2 of the Qur'an
with the main contain righteor-rsness. The latest development of the
notion of jihnd within Mtfiammadiyah can be referred to its joined
statement with the NU:
PB Nahdlatul Ulama and PP Muhammadiyah appeal that jihad for Muslim
ummah in Indonesia should be aimed to improve the quality of education,
economy/ as well as human resources. lihad should be targeted for fighting
against ignorance (kebodohan), poverty, backwardness, degradation of moral-
ity and human dignity.'r?
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The main goal of these all is ikhlas, performing things sincerely for
the shake of Allah, is quite clear within Muhammadiyah. In this con-
text, in can asserted that tajdid is the foundation of Muhammadiyah's
worldview; ijtihad is the intellectual exercises of tajdid in the field of
social and religious life and jihnd is one of the ways that these two are
implemented. The combination of this all is implemented through
the establishment of and the activities organized in its amnl usaha (Char-
ity and Financial Institutions).
A number of institutiors affiliated to or run by Muhammadiyah
play important roles in indoctrinating members and followers with
the organisation's understanding of Islam. Educational irstitutiors are
certainly among them, but it is important to note that every institution
of Muhammadiyah has a built-in prayer house for daily prayers where
three important religious aclivities are routinely organized; daily and
lum'ah prayers, dcil<zaah (preaching activities) and collecting religious
donatiors or charity (infaq Nrdsadaqah)for intemalpurposes. This means
that those activities are well-organized in more than six thousand ptayer
houses all over Indonesia.l8 The dalctuah activities are usually performed
after each prayer. The Islamic rituals that are practiced by Muham-
madiyah are introduced through direct experience and the reasons for
performing such rituals are inserted along with the dnlsuah. Since these
activities are internal in nature, only those who have the opportunity
or privilege to attend these activities will know their significance. For
example, only Muhammadiyah followers who might know the exact
contents and the methods used to indoctrinate the followers of Mu-
hammadiyah in exclusive gatherings.le
In addition, the curriculum in Muhammadiyah schools and uni-
versities devotes around 40 percent of class hours to religious sub-
jects. This is accomplished with a number of subjects called Kemu-
hammadiyahan (Muhammadiyahness), which are directed to mak-
ing someone become a Muhammadiyah follower However, from a
number of interviews conducted during fieldwork I gained the strong
impression that followers are not trained to be aware of their Mu-
hammadiyahness more than their Muslimhood. They are simply
trained to be ideal Muslims as personified in the doctrine of "com-
manding right and forbidding wrong." Therefore, regardless of what
Muhammadiyah leaders are saying, their commitment to the pristine
Islam remains firm.
Furthermore, the knowledge and indoctrination of Islam gained
from Muhammadiyah teachers is spread inevery dalauafu activity with-
in their inner circle. For example, their preachers usr.rally (if not al-
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ways) introduce their sermons, khutbah and other related religious
activities by quoting hndiths that are popular among Muhammadiyah
circles or Salafi or Wahhabi in general. For example, "I warn you of
the newly invented matters (in the religion), and every newly in-
vented matter is bid'ah (innovation), and every bid'ah is misguidance,
and every misguidance is in the Hellfire." Another hndith that usually
follows is "Whoever sees a wron& and is able to put it right with his
hand,let him do so; if he can't, then with his tongue; if he can't, then
with his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith." This is a clear
way for the sermon giver to identiSr himself as a Muhammadiyah
person. The sermon giver and Muhammadiyah followers are bound
by their religious worldviews by means of particular verses of the
Qur'an or Hadiths of the Prophet. The strongest glue is produced
from a number of verses regarding the dictum of 'commanding right
and forbidding wrong', which is found in seven verses of the Qur'an
with different phrases, but the same 'key words'.2o
The samples of verses of the Qur'an and Hadiths mentioned here
seem to be those that are most frequently referred to by Muham-
madiyah followers. Significantly, these verses are also those that are
usually referred to in many circles of radical Islamists. L:r fact, the
L04h verse of Ali Imran is the famous motto of Muhammadiyah. It
reads "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that
is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They
are the ones to attain felicity."
Muhammadiyah followers believe that their organisation is the
group of the seventy three groups of all Muslim groups that deserves
to go to lannah (heaven), while the other seventy two groups are
being misled and will go to hell. As those who hold the responsibil-
ity to command right and forbid wrong, they are convinced that
they should call upon other Muslims to join their "pristine" Islam. For
them, their intention to call other Muslims to the pristine Islam is not
for their group, they would argue, but to save the others from the
misleading. Any social and religious problems they face in their com-
munity and environment from the smallest scale to the largest one is
usually looked at from this worldview.2l
After being indoctrinated with Muhammadiyah's religious world-
view, many followers continue their normal lives as government
employees, teachers, doctors, researchers, businessmen, religious
preachers, and activists or leaders of other Islamic organisations. Some
of them may not publicly identify themselves as Muhammadiyah fol-
lowers, but their religious worldview, their culture, and their com-
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mitment to the "pristine" Islam with the aforementioned responsibil-
ity will be, in most cases, firmly held on to.
ln other words, many Muslims who have once been exposed to
Muhammadiyah's religious worldview usr-rally continue their normal
professional lives in whatever sector they work in. Yet, though they
may come from very different professional backgrounds, they are
bound together by attendingpengajinn (religious gathering) and the
five daily prayers, giving charify both regularly and irregularly, and
of course by sharing similar views concerning other Muslims and
non-Muslims. Most of them do not have Muhammadiyah ID cards
and they are not under the "control" of Muhammadiyah's organisa-
tional structure. But they are under the cultural influence of Muham-
madiyah and they can organize "collective actions", based on that
culture. For example, when they encounter social and political prob-
lems, they would feel that they could organise collective actions be-
cause they view the problems from the same Perspective. They would
be reminded by the same colrunand of "comrnanding right and for-
bidding wrong." And, as will become clear later on in this paper, it is
also important to note that Muhammadiyah leaders tend to cover Llp
the connections for variotrs reasons.
\A/hen Muhammadiyah leaders discr-rss political issues, the most fre-
quently heard term in reference people affiliated with the organisation
is cadre (knder). When talking about cadres, the point of reference are
usually those who have been active in one or several of the various
autonomous bodies of Muhammadiyah, such as IMM, Pemttda Mu-
hammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth), Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (Young
Women of Muhammadiyah), Hizbul Wathan and Remaja Muhammad-
iyah. However, the term'cadre'is also applied to those who have been
Muhnmmadiah-ized through iJs religious worldview, who have been
active in organizing Muhammadiyah-sponsored religious activities and
who explicitly promote that worldview, even though they may not
have joined any of these autonomous bodies of the organisation. Thus,
in a political sense a cadre does not necessarily refer to someone who
has been formally trained or who holds an ID card.
Tokoh (ftgure) or pimpinan (leaders or managers), finally, mostly
refers to those who are running or used to run Muhammadiyah offic-
es. Their statements represent the official line of Muhammadiyah and
no one else who is from outside this circle can make a statement on
Muhammadiyah's stance dealing with either religious or political is-
sues.22 Most of the national executives active in the so-called Pimpi-
nan Pusst hold PhD degrees (S3), and many are even honoured pro-
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fessors in different fields. Only a few hold Masters degrees (S2) and
a few others hold other higher degrees.
The massive expansion of Muhammadiyah and the persistent grass-
roots support it has received over the years is very much a result of
the influence of its religious worldview, which is largely constructed
upon three main notions; atnr ma'ruf nahy munknr, Q3:104 (commend-
ing right-forbidding wrong), fastabiqul khnyrat (Q2:148), (strive to-
gether as in a race) towards all that is good, tajdid, ijitihad and jihnd
and "be akaffah Muslim" (Q2:208). These three notions are the most
powerful recourses of Muhammadiyah's worldview because they are
in line with and embedded in every regular dn'wah activity and the
expansion of the organisation's structural bodies. Because Muham-
madiyah is driven by this worldview, it has steadily advanced since
1972 and there is no indication whatsoever that it will fade away.
Amr ma'ruf nnhy munkar (cornrnanding right and forbidding
wrong) is the most important phrase in Muhammadiyah circles as it
also is in other puritan Islamic movements in general. This verse of
the Qur'an was in fact one of the sources of inspiration of the estab-
lishment of Muhammadiyah.23 Therefore, in Muhammadiyah, it is
indicated by the fact that it is made as a religious motto on which its
vision and mission are based on. Its initial development was very
much guided by religious concerns, but over the years the interests
of its followers have broadened so that the notion of smr ma'ruf
nahy munkar has also transcended beyond religious boundaries. As
will be seen later, the notion of nmr ma'ruf nahy munkar has deeply
entered the political sphere.
From the ways that Muhammadiyah conducts amr mn'ruf nalry munkar,
there is one noticeable factor that is derived from the ideology of
Wahhabism. The most cofiunon types of munknr (wrong doings or acts)
incltrde TBC (takhnyul,bid'n and churafat). Deliar Noer has comprehen-
sibly elaborated most of what were regarded as TBC as well as other
wrong doings of Muslims duing the formation of modemist move-
ments in Indonesia. For example, many of lcyai exploited the loyalty of
their followers for their material benefits. They sold azimst (amulets,
charms) to their followers for averting evil spirits. For these kinds of
practices the followers of the lcyai gave various rewards to them.2a
Looking at the massive and persistent geographic, structural and
cultural expansion of Muhammadiyah, it is important to mention the
support of its second imperative concept. This is the notion of fastabiqul
khnyrat, which is always embedded in both daiunh activities and insti-
turtions. As has been known, most Muhammadiyah followers are Lu-
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ban, well-to-do Muslims. By using the notion of Fastabiqulkhnyrat,Mtt-
hammadiyah is very skilful in encouraging its followers to donate their
money for Muhammadiyah activities and programs with the aim of
exercising amr ma?uf nnLry munkar. Lr almost every building which is
controlled by or affiliated with Muhammadiyah one can find a kotak
amal (charity box). Amazingly, this is also true in most restaurants onmed
by people of Minangkabau in origin-one of the largest bastion of
Muhammadiyah-in most cities in Indonesia. On the box is writtery
for example, "Kotak Amal untuk membangun Mushalla or Rumah Ya-
tim Piatur X" (Charity Box for building a Mosque or Orphanage House
X). This way of implementingfastabiqulkhayrat cmbe seen as one of the
strengths of Muhammadiyah as it basically mears that the organisa-
tion is an effective fund riser. Muhammadiyah seems to be the only
Islamic organisation in Indonesia that can manage and maintain this
way of self-funding.2o
Finally, the last important concept of Muhammadiyah is "to be a
knffahMuslim (Q2:208). The notion of being akaffah (wholly or com-
pletely) Muslim is ideally implemented in two broad ways: one is
through the implementation of Islamic syari'a in all activities and en-
vironments and the other is by providing social and public services
which are solely based on the Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions.
Muhammadiyah and its ljtihad -Based Political Participation
in Post-New Order Era
The roles played by MuJrammadiyah in founding the political par-
ties of PAN prior to the 1999 general election were an integral part of
Muhammadiyah's political participation. It played a crucial role in the
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy,26 As such, it contrib-
uted significantly to the process of democratization in Indonesia. This
section explores the following questions: (L) what kind of relations
exists between Muhammadiyah and the political parties associated
with it? (2) How has Muhammadiyah faced the challenges to its reli-
gious and political aspirations, while at the same time fulfilling the
ambitions and interests of their leaders? (3) How has PAN, and oth-
er political parties that are, to varying degrees, affiliated with Mu-
hammadiyah taken advantage of the organisation? (4) How far has it
pushed this big Islamic organisation into the new current of Indone-
sian nolitics?
Studia Islamika, Vot. 15, No. 1,2008
l
Ijtihad-B aserl P olitit
PAN, Amien Rais and Muhammadiyah
The formation of PAN is a political ij tihad of Amien Rais under the
endorsement of Muhammadiyah. Never before had Muhammadiyah
had such a close relation with a political party during both a general
election and a presidential election, and never before had such dy-
namic and opat debates about politics across levels of Muhammad-
iyah and amongst its leaders taken place. Both organizations played
crucial roles in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy.zT
Despite PAN might be the closest party to Muhammadiyah there are
fwo other political parties, PKS and PPP that have been made as al-
ternatives of choices by Muhammadiyah followers in the general elec-
tion 2004.
It is clear that from the beginning the social and political vehicle that
contributed $eatly to the role played by Rais was MARA, which then
created a political embryo for the formation of PAN. MARA was formed
on 14 May 1999by fifty prominent scholars and pro-democrary activ-
ists, whose initial aim was to critically monitor the performance of Su-
harto's goverment in his last period in power. Other than Amien Rais,
those who joined and supported MARA included Goenawan Muham-
mad (the founder of Tanpo Magazine), RLal Ramii, Faisal Basri (econo-
mists), Albert Hasibuan, Baharuddin Lopa Adnan Buy'ung Nasution
(lawyers), Dawam Rahardjo (Muhammadiyah leader) and Ulil Abshar
Abdalla (NU leader). Thus it is evident that MARA was supported by
prominent intellectuals and leaders from across ethnic groups, religions,
and areas of expertise. Nakamura asserts that "The presence of these
two Muslim-based but non-cofirnunal political parties seerrrs to provide
eloquent evidence of Islam and democrary being indeed compat-ible.
They will be an effective block on the Muslim side against the growth of
any tendency leading to religious communalism.'z8 However, in my view
this variety of backgrounds had both positive and negative effects as far
as the performance of PAN is concemedi positive because it represents
unity and diversity that can lead to the creation of political strength, but
also negative because of the potential for conflicting interests. The latter
has arguably contributed to PAN's failure to gain greater support in the
IW nd 2004 general elections.
During the early days of PAN formation, the notion of political
ijitihad (political interpretation) started to play significant role in
Muhammadiyah circle. It was particularly significant after Amin Rais
getting the endorsement of Muhammadiyah to exercise his political
ijtihnd, and hence can be seen as the greatest change in the nature of
Muhammadiyah's involvement inpolitikprakfls. Never before had Mu-
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hammadiyah made sllch an open statement that involved it so deep-
ly in Indonesian practical politics. However, Muhammadiyah's en-
dorsement for Rais to establish PAN and to run in the presidential
election of 2004 can also be perceived as one of the ways in which
Muhammadiyah intended to participate in Indonesian politics in or-
der for democracy to work.ze Schumpeter notes that "the democratic
method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at [a] political
decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means
of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."s Thus, establishing a
political party is a process thror-rgh which political compefition is played
out. Not only political parties should play a role in this process, but
also religious organizations like Muhammadiyah. This might be the
best way to look at the relationship between PAN and Muhammad-
iyah. There is little doubt that the use of political ijtihad was an effort
to give political action a religious justification.
The notion of political ijtihadbecarne important in Muhammadiyah
and Indonesian politics in general once Rais's idea of establishing a
political party had been officially announced, after the resignation of
Soeharto. However, due to strong resistance from some Muhammad-
iyah leaders and activists, the relationship between PAN and Muham-
madiyah was made ambiguous. It is ambiguous because there is no
official organisational relation but most PAN leaders are actually from
Muhammadiyah. With this ambigurity, both Muhammadiyah and PAN
can benefit from each other, although neither should be disadvantaged
by the other's weaknesses. This ambiguous relationship started with
the establishment of PAN in Auglrst 1998, but the seeds had been sor,rrn
much earlier, in a series of events that led up to the establishment of
PAN. During the Muhammadiyah Tanwir of 5-7 July 1998 in Semarang,
political issues were debated fiercely. During commission meetings,
the participants in the Tnnuir proposed that Muhammadiyah devise a
way for Rais to become the national leader of Indonesia, i.e., the next
Indonesian president. This was why it was argued that Muhammad-
iyah had to establish a political party. However, the cultr-rral wing of
Mr-rl-rammadiyah was too strong to be defeated by the political wing.
Thus, no recommendation to establish a political party eventuated.
Prior to the Tanuir, Rais had been criticized by Lukman Harun (d.
April1999),3t who was knoltm to be Rais' rival. Harun said:
"I request Muhammadiyah to keep focusing itself on dakuah as usual. Apart
from that, Muhammadiyah has to stay unified with the government and
ABRI, and does not need to support Rais' activities. The matter of proposing
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Rais to be a presidential candidate is Rais's personal matter. It does not
involve Muhammadiyah, because Rais's proposal to talk about the succes-
sion of national leadership of Indonesia had been rejected by the participants
of Muhammadiyah Tanwir in 1,993, held in Surabaya.":z
PAN was established after Amien Rais's had failed in an earlier
attempt to establish an all-embracing party that would attract sllp-
porters from all segments of hrdonesian society. He tried to use as
many elements as possible in order to ensure general support for the
pafty, from secular nationalists at one end of the spectrum to radical
Islamists at the other. These elements included Muslims and non-
Muslims, modernists and traditionalists, and senior and junior polit-
ical players. The broad variety of elements suggested that there was
no coherence in' the party's direction. One conclusion that can be
drawn from this political zigzag was that Rais wanted to use the
momentum to change his image. Rais acknowledged this when he
said "I now have more appreciation of the plurality of the nation, and
feel the necessity of building a strong nation."33
The final series of events that led to the eventual formation of the
new party under the name of PAN on 23 August 1998, rather than
PAB happened at the Wisma Tempo Meeting, Sirnagalih Puncak
(Bogor, 5-6 August 1998).34 This meeting was attended by members
of several factions-Muhammadiyah, MARA, PPP, ex-Masyr-rmi lead-
ers, Gema Madani (Echo of Civil Society),35 PPSK, Tebet Socief, *d
Dewan Dakwah.36 Among those present from Muhammadiyah were
Amien Rais, A.M. Fatwa, Mochtar Mas'oed, Amin Aziz,Syamsurizal
Panggabean, Dawam Rahardjo and Abdillah Toha; from Dewan Dak-
wah, Tamsil Linrung and A.M. Luthfi; from MARA, Goenawan Mu-
hammad, Faisal Basri, Toety Herati and Albert Hasibuan; from Gema
Madani, Emil Salim, ismid Hadad and Hamid Basyaib; and fromPPP
there were Aisyah Aminy, Yusuf Syakir and Faisal Basir. At this meet-
ing yet another name for the party was proposed by Dawam Raha-
rdjo, that of PAR (Partai Amonat Ralcyat, or People's Mandate Party).
In the end, PAB, which had been the originally proposed by Rais,
was dropped and only PAN and PAR were left as choices. A vote
was taken, and the decision was made in favor of PAN, which won
the vote by L6:13 votes. Thus, the party which Rais had originally
created under the name PAB was renamed PAN. It is interesting to
note, however, that all three names had one important word in com-
mon, namely amanat (mandate). \A/hen Rais was interviewed on the
following day about the reason why PAB was changed to PAN, he
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claimed that it was easier to translate into English, which might well
be the case. Flowever, political considerations were also involved in
renaming the party, one of them being that PAB could be translated
as "People's Mandate Patty", which has leftist connotations. Another
reason/ according toFatwa,sT was that PAN could also be more easily
associated with the Pan-Islamism of Jamaluddin Al-Afghani.
One day before the declaration of PAN, Rais, who was still the
Chairman of Muhammadiyah, invited all provincial chairmen of Mu-
hammadiyah to the National Office at Kuningan, Jakarta. Several
important issues were discussed at this meeting. Firstly, Rais an-
nounced his resignation as National Chairman. It was at this meet-
ing, too, that Rais instructed that all provincial chairmen of Muham-
madiyah had to attend the declaration of PAN the following day'
\A/hile there was no resistance to this instruction, his intention to re-
sign completely from Muhammadiyah was rejected' At this time, then,
Rais was arguably still successful in maintaining the "high politics" of
Muhammadiyah.
Structure of Political Variants:
Rejectionist, Opportunist and Accommodationist
The policy of formal political openness, which is sometimes am-
bivalent but has been taken advantage of by Muhammadiyah and
the opening up of political opportunities in post New Order Indone-
sian politics, have made the followers of Muhammadiyah view poli-
tics in different ways. In general, the political views of Muhammad-
iyah leaders and activists can be categorized into three political vari-
ants. one variant which I call "political rejectionist" involves the com-
plete rejection of the idea of a PAN-Muhammadiyah connection/ or
even the idea or discourse of associating Muhammadiyah with any
political party. such people have been referred to as part of the civil
society or the cultural and moral approach as opposed to a political
approach.38 However, categorisation is not adequate to explain the
views of those who totally reject any attempt to bring their religious
organisation into the political arena. Generally speaking, political re-
jectionists can be characterized as those who prefer to work for the
amal usshn [charitable Institutions] of Muhammadiyah rather than for
the political struggle for power, They also prefer to work as dai'i
(religious preacher) to improve the quality of the Muslim ummah.
The arguments the supporters of political rejectionism put for-
ward are usually based on the view that politics is corrupt and reli-
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gious values cannot be implemented through corrupt ways. Another
reason seelrrs to be that in politics, as in the case of PAN, there is the
possibility that Muslims might cooperate with non-Muslims, who have
their own (religious) agenda. Those who can fall under this variant
are those who involved in the amal usaha, through which the interests
of Muhammadiyah followers can be promoted, taught, implemented
and socialized. This variant appears to overlook the possibility of
achieving the same through the mediums of politics. By and large,
the main aim of this variant is that Muhammadiyah is for Muham-
madiyah, Muhammadiyah is for religion and religion is for the here-
after. Although it may be somewhat of over generalization of a com-
plex issue that needs to be more deeply explored, it is evident that
the majority of those who belonging to this variant are those who
have successfully developed the amsl usaha of Muhammadiyah and
those who are a bit distant from politics in their day to day lives.
However, these are also part the same interpretation of Islam that
has been classified as "fundamentalist" or "radical." Based on a num-
ber of interviews particularly in South Sulawesi, this author is in agree-
ment with Ricklefs who asserts that "[t]ere are about a dozen such
universities and most are places of constructive, liberal thought. Uni-
versitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta (Solo) may, however, be an ex-
ception. My impression is that it maybe a significant intellectual base
for radicalism."3e The relevance of this is that there is possibility that
radical Islam will grow out of Muhammadiyah educational institu-
tions. In this group then there are those who ultimately reject politics
on the grounds that in politics Muslims may collaborate with non-Mus-
Iims and use Western systems of politics, such as democracy, which is
not derived from Islamic values but from Western values.ao
The way how Muhammadiyah leaders reject the association of
Muhammadiyah with politics or a political party varies from person
to person. For example, Sulkan, a leader of Muhammadiyah in Ban,
jarmasiry says:
"There is no obligation whatsoever for Muhammadiyah followers to vote for a
particular political party, there is no political contract lzuith PANI. So Muhammad-
iyah does not play in politics (Muhammadiyah tidak beryolitik), even though Muham-
madiyah must not be blind to politics,"al
Another leader of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi [who re-
quested not to be named] said that:
"[T]he members of Rais's campaign team Qurkam ot juru kampanye) are not
aliowed to use the Muhammadiyah name or have access to Muhammadiyah.
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Why? Because Muhammadiyah does not want to create "disease" from all
(politics). It is stupid (itu bodoh namanyn)".47
The second variant consists of those who see a political Party as a
channel for Muhamrnadiyah politicians, with ot without considering
the importance of the structural connection to Muhammadiyah' This
can be called the "political opportunist" variant. "Political opportun-
ist" means one who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve
an end, often with no regard for principles or consequences. I use the
term here to define those who make every effort to use both Mu-
hammadiyah as an organisation and its leaders as a political force or
as a shadow, in order to achieve their political goals' In the extreme
action, the supporters of this variant would want to make Muham-
madiyah a political pafty, or to create a political party which is offi-
cially acknowledged by the Muhammadiyah leadership' For instance,
Jamaluddin Amin, the Chairman of PAN of South Sulawesi (former
chairman of Muhammadiyah in that region) stated:
"I think PAN should be regarded as the Muhammadiyah political party,
because it has the same ideology. It does not have to be affiliated, but r'r'e can
say that PAN is supervised by Muhammadiyah. So we can join only one
political party. I know that it is difficult [nozu] because in the Central Board of
Muhammadiyah there are a number of those who have already joined Golkar,
such as Malik Fajar and Ardianto."a3
To support his argument, Amin went on to say:
"As far as I know, Muhammadiyah has never left off supervising (membina) a
political party. This is based on Khittah Ponorogo which states that in order for
Muhammadiyah to reach its goal, there must be a political party to accomPa-
ny it. That is the conclusion. That is why Muhammadiyah gave birth to
Masyrrmi, then Parrnusi. Why then was khittah Ujung Pandang bom? Because
by that time there was nothing that had anything more [fo offer to Muhammnd'
iyahl."aa
Kittnh Ponorogo was the result of 1969 Tanwir held in Ponorogo East
Java which affirmed that the "ideals and the stmggle of Muhammadiyah
can only be actualized through Islamic dn'wah via two channels simulta-
neously; that is political channel by means of political party and corunu-
nity channel by means of non-political organisation."as The khiitah Uiung
Pandang was revealed :rrr1977 during the 3Bd' congress of Muhammad-
iyah which eliminated the political role of Muhammadiyah through po-
liticat parties as of the khittah Ponorogo. Muhammadiyah took this stance
after there were dual boards of Parmusi; one which was led by Q--
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nawi Hadikusruna and Lukman Harun of Muhammadiyah (as the Chair-
man and General Secretary consecutively) ana the other one was led by
Dlailani Naro and Imran Kadir. The conflicts were resolved after Soe-
harto govemment intervened by appointing Mintareja and Sulastomo
as the Chairman and General Secretary.a6
In claiming that PAN and Muhammadiyah have the same ideolo-
gy, Amin's arguments seem to refer to principles. This is, in fact,
exactly the opportunist approach. PAN is a political party open to
collaboration with those of non-Islamic ideology. The open ideology
is against the very core ideology of Muhammadiyah, (mentioned else-
where in my other paper).
There are those who oppose the way proponents of political op-
portunism made use of Muhammadiyah but did not act like what
Muhammadiyah leaders. When the author asked how the opponents
of political opportunist viewed the opportunists in Muhammadiyah,
Muhammad Ramli of Muhammadiyah South I(alimantan pointed out
a number of local members of DPR who have created disillusionment
within Muhammadiyah:
"This is a good example, out of seven members of DPR from PAN in the
Municipality of Banjarmasin, there are at least five who are Muhammadiyah.
None of them did not receive it (cornryted payments), there was no one from the
Muhammadiyah element who did not receive the money. This created disillu-
sionment because they are not consistent with Muhammadiyah ideals."aT
These two examples illustrate how the two camps compete with
one another within Muhammadiyah. Yet they are significant for its
internal dynamics.
The third variant consists of those see PAN as a political party that
was forrned by Muhammadiyah, and make the former subordinate to
the latter. This can be called "political accommodationist." I dehnepoliti-
cnl accommodntionist here as those who support the idea of creating a
formal political chnnnel for Muhammadiyah cadres when it is possible to
do so, so as to accommodate those who want to play a role in politics for
Muhammadiyah ideals. One proponent of this view is Adiani a1-Alaby,
a co-chairman of Muhammadiyah South Kalimantan, who stated:
"Muhammadiyah leaders are unorganized and have joined various political
parties, PPP, Golkar, and PDIP, even though they are very few in number.
Mr-rhammadiyah followers have to support those of their politicians who
will play the best role. Then PAN was formed in which Muhammadiyah
played a role sociologically and historicaily. Generally speaking, Muham-
madiyah followers are obliged to make PAN a success."as
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Al-Alaby stated further:
"Even though there is no written commitment, in a number of provincial
and regional meetings (musyawarah), it was always conveyed to the repre-
sentatives of all autonomous bodies - Pemuda Muhammadiyah, IMM, Nasy-
iatul Aisyiyah and others - that al1 Muhammadiyah followers have to make
PAN successful, except when there are (important) local circumstances, then
such regions can make their own considerations."ae
A clear difference can be seen between the political opportunist
and political accommodationist view from what Muhammad Ramli
said "PAN's supporters depend on Muhammadiyah, we have to ac-
knowledge that. However, this only happens if Amien Rais is still
holding the position of National Chairman of PAN."50
The most minor goal of this variant is to create a connection be-
tween PAN and Muhammadiyah to the advantage of both. Adher-
ents of this view try to accommodate Muhammadiyah ideals to the
political situation. However, they still aim for their goal, which is to
implement Muhammadiyah ideals by way of politics. The mofro amr
ma'ruf nahy munknr is often used by this variant. It is here that the
difference can be clearly seen between this variant and the second
variant.
There are three main goals of the political accommodationist: (i)
to accommodate Muhammadiyah cadres who tend to play their roles
through politics; (ii) to channel and promote Muhammadiyah ideals
and interests through politics, and (iii) to balance the power of other
religious groups who are also active in politics.
Who are Muhammadiyah at a Local Level?
In Crescent Arises ouer the Banyan ?ree, Nakamura has addressed the
question of "who Muhammadiyah members are?" by examining the
membership book of Muhammadiyah of Kotagede, Yogyakarta, where
he carried out his research.sl However, as was argued above, in or-
der to examine the political role of Muhammadiyah one has to go
beyond what is simply recorded in the membership book, to look at
the religious worldview of Muhammadiyah and how this worldview
functions to create strong bonds between Muhammadiyah as an or-
ganisation and Muslims who are influenced by this worldview. Here,
two interrelated aspects are important in any discr"rssion of the polit-
ical role of Muhammadiyah at the local level. One involves with the
people, the followers of Muhammadiyah, and the other the organisa-
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tions's institutions and related dalctuah activities. One of the most im-
portant arguments for this is that the number of Muhammadiyah
followers who decide not to apply for Mr-rhammadiyah ID is far larg-
er than those who do L:30.52 But this does not mean that the'Muham-
madiyahness' of the former is less strong than that of the latter. In
addition, there may be particular interests, such as access to facilities
and other privileges that motivate those who decide to apply for
membership, because the platform cr,f Muhammadiyah states that only
those who have Muhammadiyah ID can be elected to positions in the
Muhammadiyah organisational structure.
A number of interviews with local leaders of Muhammadiyah re-
vealed that a Muslim becomes associated with Muhammadiyah in
fotrr main ways: through family linkages, education, dalcrunh activi-
ties, or autonomous organisations of Muhammadiyah, such IMM, IRM,
Nasyiatul Aisyiah and others. The first question posed to informants
about Muhammadiyah was "how did you become a member of Mu-
hammadiyah?" Interestingly, most of the informants began to an-
swer the question by referring to their parents who had Muham-
madiyah backgrounds by culture and religious practices. Some of
them added their explanation that they went to Muhammadiyah Is-
lamic schools or Muhammadiyah general schools until senior high
schools. Even though a number of informants had periods when they
attended schools other than of Muhammadiyah, when they contin-
ued on university, they started again to be associated with Muham-
madiyah, for example joining IMM (Association of Muhammadiyah
Students). Muhammad Ramli MA, the Vice Chairperson of KPU of
South Kalimantan, stated that his parents have a Muhammadiyah
background not only by culture or religious practices but also by
virtue of holding positions on Muhammadiyah boards, such as being
the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Banjarmasin. However, Ramli also
stressed that he joined Muhammadiyah and still hold fasts to it be-
cause "Muhammadiyah is a worldview; Muhammadiyah teaches me
how to think rationally and logically because Islam is the religion of
logic, there are organisations that appreciate [local] tradition [which
is syirk or khurafat)"s3
In those cases where one of their parents had NU background,
most of the informants tended to choose Muhammadiyah as their
organisational affiliation, rather than NU. The three most common-
ly mentioned reasons were the spirit of anti-TBC, professional dak-
uah activities, and the spirit of religious thought of Muhammad-
iyah. V\4rat this suggests is that there is a spirit of agency for social
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and religiolrs change in Muslim community where they live. For
example, Sr-rlkan, Head of the Election Supervisory Committee (Pan-
waslu) of Banjarmasin and a former member of Human Rights Com-
mission of Muhammadiyah Youth of South Kalimantan, revealed
that his father has a Muhammadiyah background while his mother
is NU. He went to an Islamic junior high school affiliated with NU.
However, when he studied at the university he chose to join Mu-
hammadiyah Youth.sa
Another way to address the question of who Muhammadiyah is
at the local level is to look at the public services (nmal usahn) Muham-
madiyah provides, not only for the Muhammadiyah community, but
also for other Muslims who live in surrounding areas where these
services are available. The two most important examples of these are
the hospitals or health clinics, and the houses of prayers (mosques,
mushnlla or langgar). Although those who have changed their way of
performing Islamic rituals to follow Muhammadiyah ways might not
have applied for membership of the organisation, they would be closer
to Muhammadiyah than to NU or any other Islamic organisations in
particular regions. Regular attendance of prayers three to five times
a day will have a significant impact on the awareness of local Mus-
lims that they are practicing the Muhammadiyah version of Islamic
ritr.rals. Even though the same Muslims might sometimes go to tradi-
tionalist mosqlres/ mushalla or langgar, they will not feel that sr-rch
mosques are run by NU.
Intermediary Organisations and the Future
of Indonesian Democracy
This section examines how Muhammadiyah plays its roles as in-
termediary organisations in a procedural democracy, and particular-
ly in general elections. It takes a closer look at their roles in the gen-
eral election of 2004 and the first direct presidential election in the
history of Indonesia also held in 2004. The central issue is how the
historical backgrounds of their associated political parties and the
candidates for president and vice-president are transformed into the
dynamics of local politics.
The pattern of state-society relations in the current trend of In-
donesia's democratic transition can be understood in the following
wayi
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Four linkages canbe seen in this diagram: (i) the direct mnsspattan (A),
(ii) the intermediary organisation pattern (B), (iii) the intermediary organi-
sations political parties pattern (C), and (iv) the political parties without
intermediary organisations pattern (D). Of course, there are always over-
laps across patterns, but the differences between them are significant
and determinative. Pattern A usually operates in the form of mass
appeals sLrch as street demonstrations, without the direct involve-
ment of intermediary organisations. The objectives of this pattern
most often depend on who is organising it, and also on who is pro-
viding funds for particular activities. Therefore, it is relatively unsta-
ble, particularly when the interests of those involved in the demon-
Studia Islamiks, Vol. 15, No. 1,2008
48 Suaidi Asyari
strations are merely in money and the like. Pattern B usually oper-
ates in the form of commttnications between government and lead-
ers of organisations abottt lhe issues and interests of organisations'
followers and the people in general. Because most intermediary or-
ganisations are well-established in terms of mass basis, objectives,
and to some degree sources of funding, this pattern operates fre-
quently and can be evaluated regularly. As a result, it can be more
effective than pattern A. Pattern C usually operates when intermedi-
ary organisations communicate the interests of the people to politi-
cians of the political parties such that these interests are then voiced
by the political parties. Finally, pattern D r-rsually operates thror-rgh
the interests of the people are being voiced by political parties direct-
ly, without the involvement of intermediary organisations.
Each pattern has its weaknesses and strengths. Examination of
these serves to show the importance of the roles of intermediary
organisations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, Pattem A has at least
two major weaknesses. One is that it is easy to manipulate, particu-
tarly by a group whose objectives may well be contrary to democrat-
ic values. The other is that it usually gets constituted spontaneously,
and is thus shortlived. Although this pattern might be important, it
is often the case that government encounters difficulties in having a
direct and continued communication dealing with the issues raised,
The weakness of pattern C is that there are always conflicts between
the interests of the political parties and those of the intermediary
or.ganisations. Moreover, there are sometimes conflicts of authorify
among leaders of politicai parties and leaders of intermediary organ-
isations. Nevertheless, it is still more effective than pattern A. The
main weakness of pattern D is that there are people at the grassroots
far away from tuban areas whose interests are not voiced. To make
it worse, they can become the political victims of such a pattern of
relations. Their only possibility of being heard is when journalists
help them voice their interests, In a society that includes the very
poor and the very rich, with all their characteristics, such a pattern
can be manipulated easily. Pattern D appears to be the pattern at
work in many developed countries, where all means necessary for
communication between people at the grassroots, including those who
live in rural areas, are widely available and well-maintained. In such
context pattern D operates effectively. However, such means have
not yet spread evenly in developing countries such as Indonesia.
Therefore, the roles of intermediary organisations are integral and
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vital. Out of the four patterns, thery pattern B is the most effective
and efficient, because compared to pattern A" it is controllable and
compared to pattern D it has less vested interests.
The attachment between Muhammadiyah and the political parhies
closely affiliated with each of them, as well as their roles in the Lrdone-
sian democratic transition can be analysed using the above models of
state-society relations. First, however, one important point to restress
again is that the formation of PAN and PKB, which did not adopt
'Islam' as their political ideology, has been significant for the attitudes
of the board members of Muhammadiyah and NU and their followers
in general in the two elections mentioned previously. Although there
is a small segment of Muhammadiyah that still considers Islamic ideol-
ogy to be important in politics, most of those interviewed did not
explicitly express Islamic ideology as an important concern. Converse-
ly, no local leader of NU could be found who indicated, either explic-
itly or implicitly, that the open ideology of PKB mattered to them.
Another important point for the discussion in this section is that the
founding chairmen of PAN (Amien Rais) and PKB (Abdurrahman
Wahid) both play important roles in the internal political dynamics of
the Muhammadiyah and NU communities. Ealier in this paper I have
showed how Muhammadiyah and NU were founded in provinces in
the outer islands. In this section I will now examine how PAN and PKB
were established using the already existing Muhammadiyah and NU
networks with the modalities mentioned earlier. By using pattems B
and C, it can be shor,m that these networks have contributed greatly
to the formation of PAN and PKB. L:r the same way, Muhammadiyah
and NU politicians have also used their previous positions in their
organisations to gain support for recommendation for parlicular posts
in PAN or PKB, respectively.
The section will also examine how Muhammadiyah and NU play
their roles in the process of procedural democracy; the impact of
such roles on the freedom and loyalty of their constituencies; and the
result of the general election and presidential election of 2004 in terms
of their relations between PAN and PKB with Muhammadiyah or
NU respectively. As Hefner reminds us:
voluntary organizations that characterize Islam in Indonesia have the potential to be
agents of civil society and dernocratization by promoting civil participation, if they
are able to transcend sectarianism and promote a "public culture of equality, jus-
tice, and universal citizenship."s5
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The Formation of PAN in the Outer Islands
As has been argued earlier, there were two main factors that en-
couraged local leaders of Muhammadiyah to take serious initiatives
in establishing PAN. One deals with the discourses of local leaders
during national meetings in dealing with political issues. The other is
Amien Rais's invitation to provincial leaders of Muhammadiyah on
the day before the national declaration of PAN in Jakarta in August
1998. \A/trat comes into view is that local leaders of Muhammadiyah
have understood these fwo factors to mean that the only thing they
could not do was to make PAN officially a part of Muhammadiyah
and vice versa. A11 other actions to advance their political role were
possible. Therefore, up to this point there was no significant barrier
to initiating the establishment of PAN regional boards. However, as
will be sho',.m below, most Muhammadiyah leaders who were civil
servants (PNS) faced a dilemma when they had to choose between
PAN and their employment, because of the issuance of Government
Regtrlation Number 121999 (hereafter PP No. 121999) regarding
civil servants and ABRI involved in running political parties. This
was and still is the real issue facing Muhammadiyah leaders at the
local level and one that made Muhammadiyah-PAN relations prob-
lematic, because many of those who were involved in founding PAN
carurot gain direct benefits from the parry.
According to PP No. 721999 (which is an amendment of PP No. 5
\999, artrcle 7, point one through four and articles B and 9), civil ser-
vants have to be neutral in politics. Therefore, if they want to be
members of the board of a politicalparty, they have to officially ter-
minate their status as civil servants. Because of this regulation, many
of those who initiated the formation of PAN could not actually run
the party, whereas many Muhammadiyah leaders who were not civil
servants and did not fully participate in the formation of the party
could gain advantages from the situation. As a result, Muhammad-
iyah politicians in PAN cannot always get ftill access to Muhammad-
iyah activities. As will be discussed below, this situation is very like-
ly to have contributed to PAN's rather poor election results.
In Jambi the initiators of the formation of PAN were a1l from Mu-
hammadiyah. The head of the initiator team was Drs. H. Syar'i A. Roni
(Chairrnan of Muhammadiyatg larnbi Province), while Drs. Risnal Mawar-
di (a leader of Mr.rhammadiyah Jambi and the Head of Jambi National
Museum) was the secretary, and Drs. H. Hatta, MA (a lecturer of IAN
STS Jarnbi and a senior leader of Muhammadiyah l*"bD was the trea-
surer. None of these founders was to continue running the party; all the
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top leadership position in the first PAN board had to be given to those
who actually played lesser roles in the days of leading up to PAN's
formation.s6 The first Regional Congress of PAN in Jambi was held on
2425 October 1998 in Kota Baru Jambi. According to letter number 004/
ICW-PAN/7U1998,57 in less than five weeks, all six regencies in Jambi
had established IGD (Committee for Regency Formation of PAN), more
than 40 out of 64 sub-districts had I{,C (Committee for sub-district For-
mation) and there were a number of KPR (Committee for Hamlet/Sub-
rub Forrnation). There were 111 members of KPW (Committee for Pro-
vincial Formation of PAN), most of whom were graduates (S1). Some of
them held MAs and some were PhDs. It was thanks to Muhammadiyah
networks that these massive human resources were available to estab-
lish PAN within such a short period of time's8
The list of committee members involved in the preparations for PAN
in Jambi can be broadly categorized according to four backgrounds:
their affiliation to religious organisation, ethnicity, intellectual, and en-
treprenetu profession. This variety, which disregards the puritan ideol-
ogy of Mr-rhammadiyah, shows the professional and mature attitrde of
Muhammadiyah leaders in politics in the outer islands. kr this respect,
Mietzner was only partly right when he said that PAN's leadership was
recruited largely from Mu]rammadiyah, particularly the regional boards.se
Relating to religious organisations, modemist background comes into
sight to be the most prioritized consideration. This hcludes Masytrmi,
HMI, and autonomous Muhammadiyah organisations. Among those
who canbe included in this category are Hasyim Hanafi (Masymmi) and
Normal Yahya (Fil\,fl). For ethnicity, it is quite apparent that Minangka-
bau background has priority. This is understandable as the Minangka-
bau have two advantages: first as traders they have business networks
in all centers of business in the province; second most, if not all,60 are
Mr,rhammadiyah followers.6l Most of the intellectr,rals were recn-rited from
IAN Sulthan Thaha ]ambi and Jambi university. Even though most of
those recr-urited left the party after the introduction of Law Ntrmber 12
19f/9.The fact that they were recruited in the first place clearly indicates
the professionalism of Muhammadiyah leaders and the decrease in or-
ganisational loyalty, or at least that the organisation is no longer the
only or the main consideration when Muhammadiyah engaged in exter-
nal political competitions. For the category of entrepreneurship, the team
of initiators chose Zulkifli Nudin, son of Nurdin Hatrza|t, hitherto the
most successful businessman in Jambi. Ntudin is well knov,n not only
because of his father, but also because he has successfully continued the
business after his father's death. The inclusion of individuals with these
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vadoLrs backgrounds contesting with the nature of Muhammadiyah ide-
ology among the initiators of PAN indicates not only how local leaders
of Muhammadiyah have put pltualism into practice, but also a mature
strategy in facing competition on a wider political scope.
In South Kalimantan, the formation of PAN was less progressive
than in Jambi. The initiators were all from Muhammadiyah back-
grounds, although the recruitment of the initial members of the board
of PAN was actually based on two criteria, Muhammadiyah back-
ground and entrepreneurship. Among the initiators were H. Abdo-
errivai (former Acting Chairman of Muhammadiyah South Kaliman-
tan), H. Noor Adenan Razak (former Vice-Chairman), H. Muham-
mad Rusli SHI (former Chairman of Muhammadiyah), Muhammad
Ramli (current Chairman of Muhammadiyah),62 H. Ridhani Fidzi
(former Vice-Secretary of Muhammadiyah). Three of these (H. Ab-
doerrivai, H. Adenan Razak (Chairman of PAN) and H. Muhammad
Rusli) chose to continue running the party, while the others, such as
Muhammad Ramli, chose to remain goverrunent employees.
In South Sulawesi, however, the initiative of creating an image of
such an inclusive parfy is blurred. Leitiatives to invite those of different
backgrounds were not taken seriously. Among the active initiators
were Prof. Dr. Muhammad Askin, Baharuddin Abidin, Hammadu
Tan[U I(ausar Baistui, Kahar Mustari, Yunus Tekeng, Ishak Ngeljera-
tary Sohra Ahmad Baso, Halim Kalla, Qasim Mathar, Tajuddin Rah-
man, Abraham Samad, Jalaluddin Rahman and Jamaluddin Amin. All
of these initiators were active leaders of Muhammadiyah in South Su-
lawesi. For example, Jamaluddin Amin was the provincial chairman of
Muhammadiyah. In addition, the initiators of PAN in South Sulawesi
also included Abdul AzizKahar Mtzakkar. The latter's father. Kahar
Muzakkar was a leader of Muhammadiyah, who had led the Darul
Islam rebellion movement. Up to the presen! most South Sulawesians
have regarded him as a hero rather than a rebel, The choice of Abdul
Aziz Kahar Muzakkar as one of the initiators seeffrs to have been an
effort to make nse of the sentiment towards such a heroic figtue.
Soon after the formation of PAN at the local level, Muhammadiyah
politicians were faced with a political dilemma due to PP No. 121999.
This caused many who were using their organisational mass support
for political competition to face a dilemma between "realpolitik" and
"moralpolitik": to continue leading their organisations oi to shift to
the struggle for power.6 According to Risnal Mawardi, although
leaders of Muhammadiyah argued that part of the reason they did not
choose to become furnctionaries of PAN was because Muhammadiyah
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was not a political party, the truth was that this choice was determined
by PP No. 12 1999.It has to be added here that in Indonesian society,
the status of a civil servant is prestigious, despite the fact that the sala-
ries involved are low compared to those in the private sector.
After the issuance of PP No. 121999, involved in the estab-
lishment of PAN had to leave the newly bom politicul p*9. In Jambi,
for example, none of the three initiators mentioned above stayed to
run the parry. They elected Zu\kifIi Nurdin to the office of Chairman,
even though by Islamic rituals, Nurdin acknowledged that he and his
parents were from a traditional background by religiotts practice. For
example, they practice qunut and talqin.e As a successful businessman,
he was familiar in Jambian society particularly for the charitable dona-
tions to Muslims in the province. A parallel can be found in South
Kalimantan, where Muhammad Ramli chose not to run the party, in-
stead remaining a lectuuer at IAN Antasari Banjarmasin.6s
The main reason why local leaders of Muhammadiyah took the
initiative of establishing PAN was twofold: first was the historical fact
that Rais was the Chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah
while he was establishing PAN; second, and perhaps stronger, was
Rais'intention to fight against KKN (corruption, collusion and nepo-
tism) and other wrongdoings of Indonesian bureaucrats and politi-
cians, a position that is part of the exercise of commanding right and
forbidding wrong. According to Muhammad Ramli, MA, the main rea-
son many Muhammadiyah leaders supported Amien Rais was because
they shared the same value orientation (orientasi nilai). Tl:rts view is
shared by some other local leaders of Muhammadiyah, such as As-
nawi Mukti in Jambi and Nasaruddin Razak in South Sulawesi. How-
ever, few Muhammadiyah leaders looked at PAN in terms of the pos-
sible consequences of the PAN platform, which allows non-Muslirns to
run the party and to be elected as Members of Parliament. Adiyani AI-
Alabij from Sor-rth I(alimantan, for example, stated that he was of the
same opinion as Muhammadiyah leaders from Papua and Central Kal-
imantan Provinces, He argued that in the case of regions where the
number of non-Muslims is greater than the number of Muslims who
represent PAN, Muhammadiyah followers do not have to support the
parry. They can instead choose other political parties, such as PKS, PPP
or Golkar. Adiyani argued that in regions where many PAN officials
are non-Muslims, such as in Panua, there is a strong possibility that
they witt be elected, which contravenes an unwritten comrnitment they
have.66 Adiyani stated: "Because from the beginning PAN is said to be
an open parry, non Muslims can also enter, so we have an unwritten
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comrnitment where there are candidates who are from non-Muslims.
We have to vote for a party other than PA\J''67
Although there are Muhammadiyah leaders who pay attention to
the implications of PAN's open platform, it is quite clear that this is
only a consideration where the majority of PAN office-bearers are
non-Muslims. In other words, they are not particularly against the
platform as a whole, which supports pluralism. It seems that Muham-
madiyah leaders would allow politicians of other religions to com-
pete by using PAN without the hope that Muhammadiyah followers
in PAN will also support them. This lack of support from followers
appears to be guided by the religious worldview of Muhammadiyah
discussed above which would be contravened if they support non-
Muslims politicians who might have different religious goals'
The fact that many Muhammadiyah leaders who took the initia-
tive to establish PAN later on had to give up and let others run the
party contributed to some extent to the uneasy relations between
Muhammadiyah and PAN. However, Muhammadiyah politicians in
PAN were aware of this problem and therefore they tried to make
every effort possible to strengthen the relation.
Response to PAN Ideology and Gender Issues
In the face of PAN's open ideology, Muhammadiyah leaders split
into two broad camps. Those who belong to the younger generation
tend to be aware of the importance of inclusiveness and pluralism. A
few senior leaders interviewed expressed the same view. However,
those who belong to the older generation are still stricter about the
original puitanical mission of Muhammadiyah' For most of the younger
generation in the three provinces, PAN's platform was not of great
concem, with a few exceptions in each province. There is a significant
shift in the attitude of this generation as far as puritan ideology is
concerned, particularly towards the involvement of non-Muslims in
PAN. However, despite there being many other issues, most Muham-
madiyah local leaders were atbracted by the anti-KKN stance of Amien
Rais, which is strongly connected to'commanding right and forbid-
ding wrong,' one of the basic principles of Muhammadiyah religious
worldview. This might also be due to other views of the platform that
are in line with this worldview, as discussed elsewhere. The pluralist
aspect of PAN's platform, which makes the party open to everyone, is
not very apparent to most leaders of Muhammadiyah interviewed.
According to Suwardi, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth of Jambi
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20A-2007, the main reason why Muhammadiyah should support PAN
in the 2004 elections was that through PAN they could possibly pre-
pare Amien Rais, 'Bapak Reformasi'(Father of Reform), to become In-
donesian president. In additiorg the war against KI(N could possibly
be won if Rais could be elected.68 V\4ren asked more specificallv about
the possibility that PAN wotrld also accommodate the interests of non-
Muslims, Suwardi stated clearly that 'as a young generation of Mu-
hammadiyah and personally speaking, I strongly support the prograrns
or platform of PAN.'Thus, the most important aspect here is not the
ideology, but the progralns.
However, as discussed, the original orientation of Muhammad-
iyah was highly exclusive, not only towards other groups of Muslims
with different ways of practicing Islam, but also towards non-Mus-
lims, particularly Christians. There were leaders of Muhammadiyah
who view the platform of PAN as not in line with Muhammadiyah's
mission because it holds the possibility that non-Muslims too can pro-
mote their interests through the work of this political pafiy. Such a
view is held by most of the senior leaders interviewed including
Asnawi Mukti of Jambi and Adiyani Al-Alabij of Sor-rth Kalimantan.
For these individuals, the circumstance that the PAN platform indi-
cates openness to non-Mr-rslims gives rise to a particr-rlar comrnitment
on the part of Muhammadiyah leaders as stated by Al-Alabij above.
The discussion among local leaders of Mr-rhammadiyah about
PAN's platform, the inability of those who initiated the formation of
PAN to join the party because of PP No. 22, 1999, and leadership
recruitment which paid less attention to the younger generation of
Muhammadiyah have all contributed to later developments in the
relations between PAN and Muhammadiyah. This can be evaluated
by looking at the number of votes PAN received in the 2004 generai
election, as will be discussed below.
Turning to gender issues now, placing a strong importance on gen-
der issues is a characteristic of democratic values. Mr-rhammadiyah has
not given a signal of progressive through PAN. In general, the issue of
whether to grant equal rights in Indonesian politics to women and
men is very much an ongoing process of debate. This is also true with
Muhammadiyah and PAN. It is explicit in the political regulations, but
it is far from being actr-rally implemented in the field. The situation is
even worse in the outer islands. According to PP No. 12,2003Part 65,
Article 1, every political party is encouraged to field at least 30% of
female candidates for legislative elections. This has become known as
the'30% quota'. It is infortant to note that although many claim that
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Muhammadiyah is a modemist Islamic movement, in regards to gen-
der disparity it is little different from other Islamic organisations in
Lrdonesia. Most such organisations have a separate board or autono-
mous bodies for women. As a result, if a woman is given a role in such
a male-dominated organisatiory it would only be a minor one, for ex-
ample in social and women alfats, not in the actual leadership section.
This seems to reflect the dominant view in Islamic society, where women
are usually deemed to have a secondary or purely domestic position.
Muhammadiyah politicians in PAN are no exception to this view. In
Jambi, for example, there were only seven women out of ninety-six
members (7.29%) on the first PAN board. They were Hj. Auda Syafti,
Hj. Aiisma Kuris, and Miami in the section of Health and Social Wel-
fare, and Aminah Payung, Hj. Rahman Tamin, Hj. Nurjanah and Fari-
da Manin in the section of Women's Empowerment. In South Sulawesi
there were two out of twenty-six in the second PAN board. Neverthe-
less, in this province women were given more important roles. Hj A.
Yuliani Paris was in charge as secretary, Hj A,Tjendranawati was one
of the fotu vice-treasurers. Yet in general, even if women are included
on the board, men are often dominant in decision-making processes.
Women are rarely seen representing PAN in responding to political
issues in the local news media.
Putra terbaik: Its Internal and External Significance
A discussion of putra terbnik (the best man) or sometimes knder ter'
baik (the best cadre) can be used to analyze how democratic values
are implemented in the internal organisation of Muhammadiyahwhen
there is an election for chairman of the organisation, and how this
competitive exercise contributes to external competition in Indone-
sian politics during the process of democratic transition.6e The term
putra terbaik or kader terbaik became highly significant as an icon of
Muhammadiyah's role in Indonesian politics in the run up to the 2004
presidential election, because it was one of the discourses that drove
Muhammadiyah deeper into the arena of politik praktis.
Broadly speaking, as concerns politics since the inception of refor-
masi, the followers of Muhammadiyah are divided into two camps:
pragmatic or lua politics (P /LP) and ideslist or high politics (I/HP). P /
LP refers to those Muhammadiyah activists who clearly support prag-
matic politics in order to gain power. As discussed in the previous
section, the main objective here is power. I/HP, on the other hand,
refers to those who have been working hard to prevent Muhammad-
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iyah from getting too deeply involved in politik praktis.In relation to
this, after the extended meeting in 2004, held in Jakarta, Muham-
madiyah revealed that
it fully supports the efforts of Prof. Dr. Amien Rais as the best cadre, previous
Chairman of the National Board of Muhammadiyah as well as the reformasi
leader to struggle for the continuation of reformasi and to a safe Indonesian
nation in the upcoming Presidential Election 2004.70
Although there is no reliable record, my interviews with local
leaders of Muhammadiyah revealed that the icon of putrn terbaikhas
actually been familiar to Muhammadiyah's larger constituency (kelu-
arga besar) for much longer than the period just before the 2004 pres-
idential election. During political campaigns and in the result of ev-
ery national congress, and conferences of provincial boards, putra
terbaik has always been well-recognized. Whoever intends to become
an office-bearer inMuhammadiyah has to complete a formfromwhich
the leaders and followers of Muhammadiyah can judge whether he
or she is aputra terbsik of Muhammadiyah and thus eligible to run for
Muhammadiyah office.
On the form CPCPM (Main Record of Candidates of Muhammad-
iyah Leaders), a candidate has to put his ID number, his formal and
non-formal educational background, his work experience, his organ-
isational experience in Muhammadiyah, and his wife's involvement
in the autonomous bodies of Muhammadiyah.Tl "This is what we
base the judgment of knder terbsik of Muhammadiyah on," said As-
nawi Mukti, one of the vice-chairmen of Muhammadiyah Jambi.72
Thus, based on these, knder terbuik is an honorary title given to a Mu-
hammadiyah leader which has to be based on his leadership achieve-
ments within Muhammadiyah. The assessment can be based on lead-
ership, morality, academic and political records. This way of select-
ing a leader fully satisfies the criteria of democracy in a modern sys-
tem of organisation. No one was elected to chair Muhammadiyah at
any level just because he had many supporters or santri.
However, when the discourse of kader terbaik is brought into a
wider spectrum/ the assessment within the Muhammadiyah corunu-
nity has to face a greater challenge. Prior to the 2004 presidential
election, there was a heated debate on the issue of putra terbaik that
then attracted a wider audience. This included two important issues:
first whether or not there is only one knder terbaik and whether or not
a particular name should be openly stated;73 second, whether Mu-
hammadiyah knder terbnik is relevant to Indonesian society as a whole.
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It is clear that this last issue attracted the attention of people outside
the Muhammadiyah community.
Chronologically, the discourse of putra terbsik in relation to the
candidacy for president was initially raised by Amien Rais himself
during the BanjarmasinTnnwir on 13-15 December 1996. \tVhen asked
about the criteria for a potential successor of Soeharto, Rais replied,
"the criterion that has been addressed is almost perfect, what is left is
how putra terbaikbangsa (the best man of the nation) should be recruit-
ed."7a Rais then continued, "do not worry we have got the name in
the office."Ts This seemed to indicate that this notion had motivated
leaders of Muhammadiyah to interpret knder terbsik bangsa as equiva-
lent to knder terbaik Muhammadiyah, and or vice-versa.
Dr,rring the Bali Tanwir of 2002, Muhammadiyah leaders raised two
determinative issues for the present study. One concemed the proPos-
a1 for the candidate of Lrdonesia's next president. The other concemed
the proposal of including women in the next office of Muhammad-
iyah's national leadership (2005-2010).76 Prof . Syaf i Ma'arif stated that
"ktrder terbaikMuirammadiyah has to get prepared in case he has to take
over the national mandate as the leader (president) of the courrtry."77
However, when Ma'arif was asked whetherby kader terbsik he meant
Amien Rais, he replied that knder terbnik did not rnean only Amien Rais
because Muhammadiyah had never mentioned a narne nor had it affil-
iated itself with a particular political prty.'u Ma'arif then continued by
saying that "there shouid be no fatzua of politics fby explicitly mention-
ing a name] because the Muhammadiyah family are so clever in under-
standing the language of gestures (bahnsa isyarat) or impliclit communi-
cation that was delivered by their leaders."te
The discourse of krtder terbaik attracted further attention from par-
ticipants of the Makassar Tanzuir 2003, but the dispute over whether
Rais's name should be mentioned remained unresolved. The P/LP
element of Muhammadiyah had to wait until this discourse reached
its climax during an extended meeting held from 9-10 February 2004
in Yogyakarta where Muhammadiyah issued a crucial decision as far
as the development of democratic process in Indonesia is concerned
by mentioning Amien Rais alone by name askader terbaik of Muham-
madiyah as well as the champion of reformasi in the struggle to contin-
ue reformasi and to save the nation in the 2004 Presidential election.8o
By connectingkader terbaik of Mtrhammadiyah to champi on of reforma-
si, Muhammadiyah leaders attempted to convince the wider colrunu-
nity of Irrdonesians that the putra terbaik of Muhammadiyah was in-
deed the putrs terbaik of the nation.
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Despite disputes over whether a specific name should be explicitly
mentioned (during the Bali Tnnzuir 2002), the battle between these two
wings was more clearly expressed dtuing the 26n' National Congress
of Pemuda Muhammadiyah, held in Surabaya in July 2002. A-fter a
long debate, section C of the Committee responsible for completing
the recommendations of the congress, decided to mention Rais'name
(the current Spokesperson of MPR). However, when Raja Juli Antonio,
who was in charge of announcing the decisions made by his section,
did not mention Rais, he received a strong reaction from the members
of his section. In the end, Syafruddin Anhar (the chairperson of that
particular session of the congress) came for.ward and asserted that the
recommendation of candidate for president should not mention Amien
Rais by name. It was enough to state that Pemuda Muhammadiyah
supported ka der tubaik of Muhammadiyah for the 2004 presidential eiec-
tion. Anhar stated that "Pemuda Muhammadiyah is not a political in-
stitution, but it is a moral institution."sl Supporting this, Mu'thi, the
elected national chairman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah2002-2005, said,
"when there is a reconunendation, I think it is to provide a space. It is
up to an individual to do it (mentioning the name), but institutionally
we may not give such a stamp."az
Conversely, the cultural element activists who advocated idealistic
or high politics (I/HP) argued that Muhammadiyah should not men-
tion a particular name despite the fact that they agreed that Muham-
madiyah should supportputrn terbnik of Muhammadiyah to run in the
presidential election in2004.In the end, the winner was P/LP. Amien
Rais was finally mentioned expiicitly. But when it became apparent
that Rais was highly unlikely to win the election, Muhammadiyah as
a whole suffered the political consequences because as a defeated
competitor they would loose their share in positions in the upcoming
cabinet of the new government.
At the provincial level, the discourse about putra or kader terbnik
involved different approaches. These were mainly the results of the
views of local Muhammadiyah leaders toward politics in general,
and the relationships between PAN and Muhammadiyah in the re-
spective provinces. From the perspective of putra terbsik, the relation-
ship between PAN and Muhammadiyah in the three provinces var-
ied significantly. In Makassar, for example, there was strong resis-
tance to Amien Rais among the Buginese-Makassarese Muslims, for
two reasons. One had to do with the slip of tongue by Rais when
responding to a journalist's question asking whether there was a neg-
ative campaign against him in eastern Indonesia, such as in South
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Sulawesi, where a t-shirt written "PAN and Habibie for President"
could be found. In responding to the amendment of Law No. 22 and
no. 25 1999 on regional autonomy, Rais stated:
since the implementation of the regional autonomy law, local ethno-cen-
trism has appeared, thereby sometimes there comes someone who asserts
that someone who can be appointed to be local government employee must
be from that region and those who are from other ethnicities cannot be
accepted. This is modern political ignorant paganism.s3
Rais'overly high political profile seemed to have undermined the
ethnic sensitivity of the Buginese and Makassarese, including the fol-
lowers of Muhammadiyah in this region.
Another callse of resistance to Rais was the fact that Jusuf Kalla, a
prominent businessman from South Sulawesi, was also running for
the vice-presidency with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. By organisa-
tional affiliation, Kalla was one of the Mukhtasar (Advisor) of NU,
South Sulawesi. He was and still is one of the influential Buginese
figures both under Soeharto and during the Reformasi era. As a suc-
cessful Buginese businessman who or,rms a number of large business-
es in eastern Indonesia, Kalla has provided much support to various
social and religious causes.
The emergence of the three elements in Muhammadiyah discussed
above is a product of how democratic values are respected within
this organisation. Through the use of procedural democracy at the
National Congress in July 2005, the liberal progressive and political
pragmatic elements have been excluded from the stage, at least tem-
porarily. There is an open possibility for this process to alienate those
who promote normative democratic values through procedural de-
mocracy, because the power to reject pro-democracy has its roots in
the Muhammadiyah constitution (ADIART). It is quite possible that
such free spaces in Muhammadiyah are facing even greater challeng-
es. ln other words, modernist-puritans, such as Muhammadiyah, can
adopt and use procedural democracy, but there is a dilemma when
this touches on normative democratic values, particularly when it
confronts their ideology. From this perspective, there is a real dilem-
ma both in Islam and democracy.
Despite the fact that, since mid-L995, there has been some develop-
ment in Muhammadiyah toward democratic values, two conditions
have always been obstacles: One is the style of individual leadership
which depends greatly upon the majority who have the right to vote
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during the National Congress; the other is the puritanical ideology
that has been the main force keeping this organisation in existence.
Muhammadiyah is, therefore, an organisation that has reformist ide-
als, is institutionally modem, but ideologically radical-puritan.
Elections: Exercising Freedom or Demdnstrating Loyalties?
Before going further into the discussion of the 2004 election re-
sults at the local level, it is important to recall several facts of the
results at the national level. One of the most significant aspects of the
election results which has received little attention from political ana-
lysts and politicians alike is the fact that there is a big discrepancy
between the number of votes received and the number of seats gained
for parties like PAN and PKB. As Table 10 shows, PKB receivedll.s7%
of the vote, but only gained 9.45% of parliamentary sphTs-(s2). PAN,
on the other hand, gained or:ily 6.44"/. of the populal vote, but was
awarded 53 seats (9.64%).
Adapted from http: / /www.kpu.go.idl
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Another important fact is that in most provinces in the outer is-
lands, including those relevant for this study, the approximations of
the followers of traditionalist Islam are far larger than those of mod-
ernist-puritanical Islam (60%:L5%). However, PKB, the party closest
to NU, gained no DPR seats in South Sulawesi or Jambi.e Similarly,
in the provincial DPRD's the party also failed to gain any seats. These
phenomena lead to some important inquiries: ls the alleged "abso-
lute" obedience of followers of traditionalist Islam toward lcyai lrrlah
or reality?8s Are there differences between Javanese traditionalist
Muslims and their counterparts in the outer islands? In other words,
is obedience toward lryni predominantly determined by traditional-
ist religiosity as such or rather by ethnicity? Is the disobedience in
the outer islands caused by rational calculations or by different de-
grees of respect toward lcyai? Can, on the other hand, the fact that
most Muhammadiyah followers did vote for PAN be explained as a
result of stricter obedience toward their leaders' appeal or was it
rather a result of rational thinking? Answering these questions will
show how important it is to understand the significance of local pol-
itics in Indonesia.
Local Response to Issues
and Guidelines for Elections
To stafi wittu there are three aspects that need to be examined in
relation to the guidelines for the 2004 general elections in their rela-
tions to the role of Muhammadiyah as intermediary organisation in a
procedural democracy: first, the responses of local Muhammadiyah-
followers to these organizational guidelines; second, issues that have
significant meanings from the perspective of democracy; and third,
the degree of loyalty that might have influenced the followers of NU
and Muhammadiyah in both general election and presidential elec-
tion.
Well before the actual campaign period of the 2004 parliamentary
and presidential election, the National Board of Muhammadiyah had
already addressed these two critical events at the annual Tanwirs
(2002 in Bali, 2003 in Makassar and also in the expanded plenary
meeting in February 2}MinYogyakarta). These initiatives sent a clear
message that Muhammadiyah wanted to be involved actively in
moulding the Indonesian transition to democracy. It was done so by
means of participating in the process of determining presidential and
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legislative candidates for the elections. Muhammadiyah leaders en-
thusiastically followed every political development surrounding the
two elections. These initial efforts were followed r-rp by the issuance
of political guidelines for Muhammadiyah followers, which were dis-
tributed nationally. These guidelines were particularly finalized at
the extended plenary meeting of the Central Board in Yogyakarta on
February 2004.86
These opening words of the appeal of Muhammadiyah for the
general elections and the presidential election are very crucial in the
sense that they can make the followers of Muhammadiyah aware of
the values of their participation in the process of democratisation.
This can be ascertained from the key issues that are included in the
abovementioned preamble. For example, Muhammadiyah regarded
the general elections as an opportunity to end the multifaceted crisis
in Indonesia for every segment of the society. In order to end the
crisis, the Indonesian people had to be involved in creating an agen-
da for active involvement, particularly through their participation in
the legislative and the presidential elections. In addition, their partic-
ipation was not only regarded as giving their vote, but also as mak-
ing sure that the elections would be carried out in accordance with
the principles of democtacy, namely critically, honestly, peacefully,
and free from any oppression.
Furthermore, Muhammadiyah gave a gentle reminder that in
order to implement democratic values everyone had to stay away
from money politics, violence and other non-democratic activi-
ties. Pointing out these issues is imperative because such issues
are the real problems the country faces. Finally, in order to reduce
the social and economic costs of democratic consolidation, Mu-
hammadiyah urged everyone to accept the election results, regard-
less of who would win. These key issues show us an advanced
and mature attitr-rde of Mr-rhammadiyah in participating in proce-
dural democracy.
For the legislative election, the appeal read as follows:
The legislative institution and the Indonesian system of politics during the
era of reformasi has to be the checks and balances factor against the executive,
and it also has to run the political functions for the benefit of the people.
Therefore, legislative members for DPR, DPRD and DPD are needed who
truly have responsibility, morality, vision and a high ability to struggle for
the real interests of the people.
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In relation to this, Muhammadiyah urged all the followers of
Muhammadiyah:
1. to vote for legislative candidates who really posses a high quality
of moral (akhlaq), responsibility, capability, and quality mission as
well as a high commitment to struggling for Muhammadiyah's
mission for the interests of the ummst and the nation;
2. to vote for legislative candidates and the political party which can
give a great and direct chance for the election of the best cadre of
Muhammadiyah in the Presidential Election 2004;
3. to vote for a DPD candidate (Regional Representative Council)
from Muhammadiyah who is recommended and represents the
majority aspirations of each region/province;
4. to vote for female legislative candidates from Muhammadiyah in
the 2004 general election; and
5. to not vote for legislative candidates who have problems and are
involved in cases of immorality, corruption, human rights viola-
tions, violation of the public interest and (other) legal matters.sT
There are several points that can be made from the above polit-
ical guidelines of Muhammadiyah. First, Muhammadiyah intends
to educate its followers as to how they should participate in the
current democratisation process. Even though the document has
the character of an official guideline, it did not mention any organ-
isational punishment for those who did not obey it, Therefore, it
could be argued that this kind of guideline does not set limits to the
freedom of choice for the followers of Muhammadiyah. The loyalty
of the followers of Muhammadiyah should not be measured along
the question whether or not they obey such a guideline, but it should
rather be measured by looking at the substantial meanings of the
political guidelines in the process of maturing democracy in the coun-
try.
Second, as a religious organisation with a large number of follow-
ers Muhammadiyah would like to participate in the Indonesian de-
mocratization process by means of gaining political power without
becoming a political parry. This effectively means that Muhammad-
iyah will maintain its character as a civil society organization as op-
posed to practical politics. The experience of being involved in prac-
tical politics in the 1950s when it joined Masyumi appears to have
become not only a political trauma but also a good political lesson for
Muhammadiyah. It can also be interpreted that Muhammadiyah has
Iearnt from the experience of other Islamic organisations such as NU
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that have experienced many internal conflicts due to its direct politi-
cal involvement. Therefore, despite its eagerness to participate in
politics, strong efforts were also made to anticipate unintended dis-
advantages that may come with direct involvement. This approach
seems to be in line with the logic of "high politics" mentioned else-
where.
The encouragement to support candidates for the DPD was very
strategic because Muhammadiyah leaders who are government em-
ployees did not have to be bound by political regulations in which
they have to choose between their work and a political party.88 DPD
candidates stood as individuals but not as members of political par-
ties. In regards to this, Muhammad Ramli stated:
[if I joined a political partyl I wili be together with various [bad political]
attitudes which are difficult to manage and control. There will be internal
conflicts. For example, the existing polilical parties nowadays are on average
split. There are those who established their own new political parties [be-
cause of conflicts], though in PAN this reality is not that apparent. I am going
to be a regional representative. This means that every party can vote for me
because I am not representing any political party.un
The third important point is that Muhammadiyah did not advise its
followers to vote for any particular candidates. Significantly, no partic-
ular name was mentioned in the guideline. However, there was a grow-
ing pragmatic segment within the Muhammadiyah community that
had a strong political desire (as in the case of NU mentioned later) to
bring Muhammadiyah deeper into politik praktis, This was indicated
during a national meeting of regional boards of Muhammadiyah at the
Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UI\.ry on 20 Febru ary 2004.
At this meeting a new guideline of how to use Muhammadiyah net-
works in all remote areas (pelosok) of hrdonesia was htensely discussed.
As a result, Muhammadiyah cadres are not only advised to use the
organization's networks, but also to conduct a door-to-door campaign
of Indonesian Muslims for Amien Rais-Siswono Yudhohusodo.eo Even
Syaf i Ma'arif stated that the action plan (for campaigning for Amien
Rais-Siswono) to use Muhammadiyah networks from national level to
remote areas has been made at the llMY meeting.el
This explicit mentioning of Amien Rais'name, I would argLle, was
not the intention of Muhammadiyah as a whole, but it was rather the
ambition of Rais's team to make use of Muhammadiyah networks.
The main supporters of this kind of "misleading guideline"e2 were
Muhammadiyah leaders who were given important positions in PAN
as a trade off. It was not purely the initiative of Muhammadiyah as
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an organisation. There was a kind of battle between the political wing
of Muhammadiyah community and the civil wing. By the issuance of
this misleading guideline, the political wing of Muhammadiyah had
temporarily won the battle. Therefore, when the results of both elec-
tions were not as great as expected, not all Muhammadiyah leaders
and followers shared the feeling of being defeated.
However, to show how mature the political atlitudes of many fol-
lowers of Muhammadiyah are in general, it is important to point out
how difficult it was to implement such a clear guideline both for PAN
and Amien Rais from the national board of Muhammadiyah at the local
level. There were many unanticipated factors that were not considered
by the Muhammadiyah-PAN team in making all the points inthe guride-
line to be effective. Every region has its own social and politicai prob-
lems in this regard. For example, in South Sulawesi the most important
consideration for Buginese and Makassarese when they cast their vote
was their ethnic identity as Buginese or Makassarese. It is quite convinc-
ing that ethnic attachment that was discussed earlier still has a strong
influence in the cturent politics in Sor-rth Sulawesi. The second is being a
Muslim, and only the third most important factor might be affiliation to
a religious organisation. Therefore, followers of Muhammadiyah in South
Sulawesi might have voted for legislative candidates of PAN because
these candidates are Buginese or Makassarese, but the same people might
not have voted for Amien Rais to become president. This can be seen
from the comparison between the election result (see the details of gen-
eral election and presidential election below).
For the presidential elections, the political appeal of Muhammad-
iyah stresses on the development of democracy as a momentlrm of
change for continuing the reform and saving the country (see Appen-
dix i). In accordance with the decision of the Denpasar Tanwir,2002,
and Makassar Taruuir 2003, Muhammadiyah announced that is fully
support the initiatives of Prof. Dr. H. M. Amien Rais as tl:.e kader
terbnik to struggle for the continuation of reformasi and to save the
nation in the presidential election 2004 (see Appendix i). In addition,
it is stated:
L. It is hoped that the president of Indonesia who will be elected in
the 2004 election will: struggle for the continuation of reformasi
and salvation of the nation; be a reformist leader, clear from I(KN
(corruption, collusion and nepotism); run good governance; have
a broad vision about the nation; be determined and dignified in
bringing the nation to the middle of international friendships; be
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able to increase the welfare of the people, and to advance the life
of the nation heading to a better ftiture.
2. Urging the followers of Muhammadiyah and ask the people (of
the country) to sr-rpport the election of President and Vice-Presi-
dent who is able to perform the mandate of the reformasi as well as
to save the nation.e3
However, despite the comprehensive aforementioned guidelines,
followers of Muhammadiyah at the local level are politically divided
into three main groups. The first group came with the slogan "Amien
Rais Yes, PAN No." The slogan was coined for two different reasons.
The first is based on the fact that Muhammadiyah politicians are not
only members of PAN, but they have spread to other major parties
as well, including Golkar, PPP, and PI(S. The second reason is the
open ideology of PAN which opens the door to cooperate not only
with Muslims from Muhammadiyah, but aiso with non-affiliated
Muslims and non-Muslims. For those who adhere strictly to the world-
view of Muhammadiyah, such a possibility will undermine their faith
to the worldview of Muhammadiyah. Although supporters of this
groLrp can be found in all three provinces, the explicit slogan was
only found in South Kalimantan. The main reason this slogan was
used during the campaigns for the legislative and presidential elec-
tions was the open ideology of PAN. Muhammad Ramli (the Chair-
man of Muhammadiyah of South Kalimantan) argued "our support
for Amien Rais is 100% but for PAN there is a slogan "Amien Rais
Yes, PAN no" ... because PAN is an open political party which every
segment of the society can join, even infidels (orang kafir). There are
Chinese and Christians."e4
Another reason was the negative campaign against unpopular PAN
politicians who had earlier been elected as members of regional leg-
islatr-rres to accommodate, promote and protect the interests of Mu-
hammadiyah, In South Kalimantan, for example, there was once a
group of Muhammadiyah youths that wished to leave PAN becar-rse
they thought that PAN did not accommodate the interests of Mu-
hammadiyah. During a joint closed meeting between members of
DPRD South Kalimantan and Muhammadiyah leaders and activists,
a ntrmber of Muhammadiyah youths came out with a proposal,"Pak
Ramly kami Angkatnn Muda Muhnmmsdtyah siap mendeklsrasikan kelunr
dnri PAN."e5 This is significant because the emphasis was put on'the
interests of Muhammadiyah'. However, Ramly rejected their pro-
posal.
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What do the interests of Muhammadiyah mean for Muham_
madiyah leaders in this context? I found that there are two main
meanings of interests'when Muhammadiyah lead.ers or activists
use this word in relation to pAN and Indonesian poritics in gener-
al' one meaning deals very much with the worldview of Muham,
madiyah against the open ideology of pAN. In the constitution ofMuhammadiyah it is written that the objective of Muhammadiyah
is "to perform and highly respect Islamic teachings so that the tru-
est Islamic society can be created."e6 Accordinglo this view, the
open ideology of PAN, especially the fact that the party is open to
non-Muslims, is against the interests of Muha--uaivurr. The oth-
er meaning of interest' is more pragmatic and politicar. In Jambi,
south Kalimantan and south surawesi, most oi the politicians ofMuhammadiyah who were recruited by pAN were senior leaders
of Muhammadiyah while there were many younger activists who
were not recruited even though they wished to be. The regurar
cadre recruitment through Muhammadiyah youth and Muham-
madiyah student Association has been too fast compared to thelimited posts available for them such as in both in pAN and Mu-
hammadiyah board. Therefore, when pAN recruited non-Muham-
madiyah people while ignoring the aspirations of Muhammadiyah
people, many in Muhammadiyah regirded that as a failure to ac_
commodate the interests of Muhammadiyah. However, the mostimportant meaning of 'the interests of MuhammadiyalL,seems todeal with its religious worldview that is commanding right and for-bidding urong. The failure of politicians of pAN h ri"gndng against
corruption in south I(alimantan, according to MuhammJ Ramti,
is part of the failure of Muhammadiyah poriticians in promoting
the interests of Muhammadiyah.e7
Flowever, there were also several leaders in the local Muham-
madiyah communities who argued that their support for Amien Rais
was not merely because Rais was a Murrammadiyah leader, but rath-
er because they shared his ideals in many respects. Muhammad Ram-li, MA., for example stated:
I do not want to be trapped with "we are all Muhammadiyah" or ,,we are alrHMI" or "we are all NU", therefore we have to work u.,a n"tp each other(saling tolong menolong).I do not want to be like that. \r\hat makes me close toAmien Rais, for example, or with others is not because ef \{qr666a,i.,.LNU, or PMII, but because we share simiiar value orientauo.r; u.,ti.J.iriftion, for example.es
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The second group came with the slogan of "sesusi hati nurani" (in
accordance with one's conscience). This slogan was quite familiar
within Muhammadiyah constituencies during the campaign period
in March 2004. Local followers of Muhammadiyah had their own
interpretations of the guidelines issued by the national board. There-
fore, two totally different messages of the mottos could be heard.
Based on the responses of many informants, it is clear that this slo-
gan was quite significant in meaning for many Muhammadiyah fol-
lowers in making their decisions during the parliamentary and pres-
idential election 2004. In general, even though there are different
ways of how Muhammadiyah leaders responded to the guideline
mentioned above, it is clear that their goal was basically how to win
the election which was implicitly found in the above guideline and
statement of their leaders. This is actually an essence of ijtihad dem-
ocratic participation as discussed earlier, Muhammadiyah's political
behaviour is not merely to participate democratically but also to
wln.-"
Legislative Election 2004:
The Decline of Religious Loyalty?
The results of the 2004legislative elections in Jambi, South Kal-
imantan and South Sulawesi show that many traditionalist Mus-
lims have not voted for political parties connected to traditional-
ist Islamic organisations like NU. Their political choices were not
based on religious loyalty, but on rational calculations about what
would suit them best in a democratic political sense. This can be
seen from the number of those who voted for PKB, which was
nowhere near the approximate number of followers of NU in the
respective provinces. On the other hand, PAN received greater
support compared to PKB. It received even larger than the ap-
proximation of the followers of Muhammadiyah. There is a big
discrepancy between the approximation of the number of tradi-
tionalist Muslims and those who voted for PKB. As can be seen
from Charts III, IV and V, PAN achieved better results than PKB
in all three relevant provinces.
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These figures are adapted from www.kpu.go.id and Kompas, Peta
Politik Pemilihan Umum, p.3.
As can be seen from Chart III, PAN received a far bigger propor-
tion of votes, more than three times bigger than PKB did. Even if the
figures of other political parties that are also associated with NU
(PBR and PPP) are combined with those of PKB, PAN's vote is still
higher than the votes of these three parties together. If the figures of
PKB in Jambi are compared to the votes the party received in Java, it
is clear that the number of PKB votes in Java is around three times
higher than in Jambi. Interestingly, it is exactly the opposite in the
case of PAN. This party achieved a much better result in ]ambi than
in ]ava. Another important evidence from the chart is that those who
voted for Golkar n 1999 probably moved to PAN in the 2004 elec-
tion, not to PKB. Colkar received 34.70 percent in 1999, but fell to
24.72percent in 2004.100 In sum, the maioriW of traditionalist Muslims
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in ]ambi did not vote for parties that are associated with NU, where-
as it appeared that most, if not all, of the followers of modernist
Islam which are associated with Muhammadiyah voted for PAN or
PKS. h other words, Muhammadiyah supporters apparently largely
followed the guidelines of their organization, which had not only
urged them to make the election a political success, but also to vote
for PAN.
These figures are adapted from www.kpu.go.id and Kompas, Peta
Politik Pemilihnn Umum, p.3.
Chart IV shows us even more valuable information as far as the
general knowledge about Muhammadiyah is concemed. The figures
in the chart also contradict the general knowledge about NU and the
political atLitudes of the followers of each organisation. Muhammad-
iyah followers have been regarded as difficult to be managed politi-
cally, while NU followers are regarded as 'absolutely obedient to
their kyai'.101 In addition, South Kalimantan has been acknowledged
to be one of the few strongholds of traditionalist Muslims in the
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A Comparison of the Result of 2004 Elections
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outer islands. As can be seen, however, PAN received a much bigger
vote share than PKB in this province. Yet, the most intriguing fact
from the chart is that it was neither PAN nor PKB, but PKS which
achieved the best result of all new Islam-based parties.
These figures are adapted from wu'w.kpu.go.id and Kompas, Peta
Politik Pemilihnn Umum, p.3.
Chart V shows a totally different picture as far as PKB and NU are
concemed. PKB only finished eleventh in South Sulawesi, far below
other Islam-based parties. PKS, on the other hand, managed to come
in second, just after Golkar. PAN received nearly the same percent-
age of votes as in ]ava. According to Jamaluddin Amin and Nasarud-
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A Comparison of the Result of 2004 Elections
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din Razak, in addition to those who have clearly stated that they
supported PAN, there were those whose backgrounds are Muham-
madiyah but in practical politics preferred to join pKS, ppp, pBB and
Golkar.1o2 This seems to indicate that the number of the followers of
Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi is bigger than commonly estimat-
ed (less than 10 percent of South Sulawesian sanfri Muslims).
Looking at the results from a comparative Java-Outer Islands per-
spective, there are a number of possible reasons as to why pAN re-
ceived a bigger number of votes than PKB. First, let us look at pAN and
Muhammadiyah, which show a better perforrnance compared to pKB.
Here are some possible explanations. Firstly, the political guideline of
Muhammadiyah was explicitly aimed atboth making the election a suc-
cess and making PAN the party of choice for Muhammadiyah follow-
ers. hr order to pave the way for Amien Rais to become a presidential
candidate, Muhammadiyah followers would also have to vote for pAN.
Jamaluddin Amin, the Chairman of PAN South Sulawesi and former
Chairrnan of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi, in this regards said:
So, Semarang Tanwir decided that there should be a change in Muhammad-
iyah. It was there that Amien Rais was given a mandate to perform his
political ijtihnd, so that PAN was established. PAN was actually bom from
Muhammadiyah. That is why I joined PAN, because I feel that I also estab,
lished PAN. ... Muhammadiyah is amr ma'ruf nahy munkar from the social
aspect, whereas PAN is from a political aspect. Muhammadiyah has to be
supported by a political party in conducting amr ma'ruf nahy munknr rn this
country.l03
Secondly, the attachment of politicians of Muhammadiyah with
their organisations and constituents is stronger compared to pKB
politicians to NU. Activities of institutions of Muhammadiyah con-
stantly maintain the attachment between the leaders and their fol-
lowers. Therefore, supporting politicians of Muhammadiyah in pAN
would mean slrpporting Muhammadiyah leaders. Chairul Naim and
Syafri Sofyan (both candidates of PAN in lambi) acknowledged that
in order for PAN to gain greater support from the Muhammadiyah
community they used a personal approach. This personal approach
seemed to be based on two important considerations. One has some-
thing to do with the independence of Muhammadiyah from politics.
It can be generalized that while most Muhammadiyah leaders did
not want to drag Muhammadiyah into politik praktis, they wanted to
gain advantages from political situations. Therefore, Muhammadiyah
leaders who did not join PAN, such as Asnawi Mukti and others,
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allowed any kind of actions taken by PAN-Muhammadiyah politi-
cians as long as they were not openly expressed. Chairul Naim stated
"most of the time we approached figures of Muhammadiyah after
every activity of pengajiart, usually during breaks (ramah tamah).They
ur" th" ones who spread our names in Mr-rhammadiyah circles''nn
Thirdly, the general approximation of Muhammadiyah followers
might only be accurate in Java, but not in the outer islands. In addi-
tion, traditionalist Mr-rslims who might also have used the religious
institutions of Muhammadiyah, such as mosques, mushnlla and lang-
gar perltapshave politically supported politicians of Muhammadiyah
whom they might be familiar with. In the case of south sulawesi, it is
clear who follows Muhammadiyah while those who do not follow
Muhammadiyah cannot automatically be regarded as followers of
NU. This is even less accurate in terms of political sr.rpport. It is safe
to assume that the majority of Muhammadiyah followers have voted
for PAN in all three regions with a small exception in south sulawesi.
The 2004 Presidential Election:
The Decline of Religious-Charismatic Authority?
There were five pairs ruru-ring for Indonesian President in the 2004
presidential election: Bambang susilo Yudhoyono with Jusuf Kalla
from the Democrat Party (sBY-Kalla), Megawati soekarno Putri with
Hasyim Muzadi from PDIP (Megawati-Hasyim), Amein Rais with
siswono Yudo Husodo from PAN (Amien-siswono), wiranto with
Salahuddin Wahid from Golkar PartyWiranto-salahuddin, and
Hamzah Haz with with Agum Gumelar from PPP (Hamzah-Agum)'
In one way or another, all the five running pairs of candidates in
the 2004 presidential election were associated with leaders of Islamic
organizations or parties. First, Amien Rais was the former National
Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Regarding candidates associated with
NU, four out of the five running mates of the presidential candidates
had NU backgror,rnds. First, Jusuf IGlla was a member of Mustasyar
(Advisor Board) of NU of south sulawesi. It has to be acknowledged,
however, that despite the fact that Kalla had an NU background, his
political career, arguably, had less to do with his background as an
NU leader. There were for-rr integrated main factors that have sup-
ported his political career. Kalla was a member of HMI and KAHMI
that used to have strong links of networks in Indonesian po1itics.105
Also, using those networks later significantly contributed to his 39
year involvement in Golkar. Additionally, as a successful business-
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man, he was well acqLrainted with Muslims in the eastern part of
Indonesia. And finally his name became even more well-known as
an important national leader after he initiated the Malino peace pro-
cess for Poso and Malukr-r. In addition to this all, when his name was
combined with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono'sJavanese name, he could
also be seen to represent the outer islanders, similar to the case of
Soekarno-Hatta in which the latter was from Sumatra.106
Second, Hasyim Muzadi was the nationai Chairman of NU though
he relinquished his position in the organisation just after he was ap-
pointed as the vice-presidential candidate of Megawati Soekamoputri.
It was solely due to his position as the National Chairman of NU that
Megawati and her PDIP invited him to be her running mate. Third,
Salahuddin Wahid was a Vice-Chairman of the National Board of NU
and was also a brother of Abdurrahman Wahid (former President of
Indonesia and the former National Chairman of NU). He was also the
Head of National Hr-rman Right Commission that was involved in in-
vestigating human rights violation in East Timor. Although Salahud-
din was a leader of ICMI, it appeared that this factor was iess signifi-
cant in making him be a running mate of Wiranto compared to his
background as an NIJ leader. Fourt[ Hamzah Haz frorn Banjar in
South Kalimantan, had been Chairman of PPP and was strongly asso-
ciated with NU. He was accompanied by Agum Gumelar. Although, it
is common that presidential candidates are more significant than vice-
presidential candidates, the role of religious affiliations of the vice-
presidential candidates in the 2004 presidential election is quite signif-
icant in meaning. This was because it was this issue that made vice-
presidential candidates to be considered in getfing votes.
As can be seen from Chart VI below, the result of the first round
of the 2004 presidential election showed that none of the candidates
that were associated with religious leadership fared particularly well
in the election with the exception of Jusuf Kalla. Nationally, Amien-
Siswono, Megawati-Hasyim, Wiranto-Salahuddin, and Hamzah-
Agum received only between 3.01- percent (Hamzah-Agum) and26.67
percent (Megawati-Muzadi). On the other hand, SBY-Kalla with less
association with religious leadership received many more votes than
their nearest rivals, Megawati-Hasyim. Of course there were a nlrm-
ber of interconnected factors at play that accounted for the results,
but from the perspective of religious sentiment and affiliation, it is
significant to note those who were associated with religious leader-
ship were mostly eliminated in the first round. Of the three candi-
dates of Vice-President with an NU background only Megawati-
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Hasyim managed to pass through to the second round as mnner up.
This brief review shows that in such a free electiory most Indonesian
Muslims did not base their electoral preference on Islamic charismat-
ic leadership. In the following paragraphs, we will now look at the
election results from the perspective of the outer islands and exam-
ine what the results can tell us about the role of Islamic organisations
in Indonesia's democratic transition.
*Adapted from kpu.go.id
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From the chart above, there are several points that merit discus-
sion as far as the role of Muhammadiyah and NU is concerned, par-
ticularly regarding the estimate of the numbers of Muhammadiyah
followers, their loyalty and their freedom of choice. First, the per-
centage of votes received by Amien-Siswono was consistently higher
than the percentage of Muhammadiyah followers in each area, as
estimated by Muhammadiyah leaders. As indicated elsewhere, most
Muhammadiyah leaders interviewed stated that Muhammadiyah
followers in Jambi, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi made up
approximately from 7"/" to L0% of the santriMuslims. As briefly sug-
gested much earlier, Muslims made up around BB"h of Indonesian
population. Santri Muslims are around 60% of Indonesian Muslims.
So, there are roughly 4-5% Muhammadiyah followers of the total
population in the three provinces. Yet we see from the chart that
Amien-Siswono receivedLl6l% of the votes inJambi, 21.72% in South
Kalimantan and 1.0.71% in South Sulawesi. This could suggest that
the numbers of followers of Muhammadiyah in those provinces are
perhaps greater than the estimation that was made by the religious
leaders interviewed. It can also be argued that Amien Rais success-
fully gained support not only from Muhammadiyah but also gained
Iimited support from non-Muhammadiyah constituencies. Second, it
was unexpected that in South Kalimantan, which has commonlybeen
regarded as a strong base for traditionalist Muslims in the outer is-
lands, Amien-Siswono scored a very good result. This could mean
either there has been an increase in the number of Muhammadiyah
followers in this province, the generally held estimate about the num-
ber of followers was simply wrong, or for some reason these candi-
dates were able to garner exceptionally large support outside of Mu-
hammadiyah followers in this province. The spread of resistance to-
ward a woman president as a result of the fatwa of Langitan lcyai
(discussed below on the failure or Megawati-Hasyim) could be an
important factor in favouring Amien-Siswono (and also SBY-Kalla)
over Megawati-Hasyim. Third, in Jambi, where PAN received more
than 17 percent in the parliamentary election, Rais-Siswono only re-
ceived 1"L.61 percent of the presidential vote. As discussed earlier
there were many traditionalist Muslims who voted for PAN because
of the Zulkfli factor (but not voting for Amien Rais as their candidate
of President). As indicated previously, ethnic sentiment might also
have played some role in this province. The fact that Kalla's wife was
of Minangkabau background might have made Minangkabau people
in Jambi voted for SBY-Kalla instead of Amien-Siswono.
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Chart VII:
Comparison of First and Second Round Presidential Elections
in Jambi South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi in Per Cent*
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The second round of the presidential election shows even more
fascinating results. Though there were other factors that can be con-
sidered, it was clear that there were no correlations between affilia-
tion of religious organisation and political choice. Most of those who
voted for candidates other than Megawati-Hasyim in the first round
voted for SBY-Kalla in the second round, no matter whether a prov-
ince was a basis of haditionalist Muslims or not. Lr many cases, even
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in villages sLrrrolrnding pesantren, the large majority of those who
lived there did not vote for Megawati-Hasyim/ but for SBY-Kalla.
There are several points that can be taken from the above facts as
far as the connection between religious affiliation and a free political
choice are concerned. First of all, there is strong evidence presented
above that most Muhammadiyah followers voted for Amien-Siswono
in the first round of the presidential election. However, Muhammad-
iyah leaders interviewed have suggested that their loyalty to their
leader is not because of their Muhammadiyah membership per se,
but because of their commitment to the Muhammadiyah religious
worldview. One can also speculate that when there was competition
particularly from NU they would support leaders who have a com-
mitment to the Muhammadiyah worldview.lO7
In South Kalimantan, Muhammad Ramli, the current Chairman of
Muhammadiyah stated: "Our support for Amien Rais is 100'k,... This
means that in order to support Amien Rais, Muhammadiyah has giv-
en 100% guarantee."lo8
The second important point that can be seen from the chart is that
there was an exception in this regard, namely in South Sulawesi. In
this province, which is the home of Jusuf Kalla, leaders of Muham-
madiyah were divided into two main camps. This division seemed
to be caused by the fact that I(alla was of Bugis origin. One camp
gave full support for Amien Rais while another camp gave their fol-
lowers freedom of choice between Rais and Kalla. From the first camp,
Jalamaluddin Amin, the former Chairman of Muhammadiyah South
Sulawesi, argued that Muhammadiyah followers should give full sup-
port for both Amien Rais and PAN because the political vehicle for
Amien Rais was PAN. Therefore, Jamaluddin Amin complained about
the motto "Amien Rais Yes, PAN No" because it did not show that
Muhammadiyah followers were clever. He acknowledged this by
saying that "Muhammadiyah followers are clever, but they very of-
ten make a slip of the tongue (keseleo lidnhl."roo Thus, according to
Jamaluddin Amin such a motto was a slip of the tongue by the (usu-
ally) clever Muhammadiyah. From the second camp, Nasaruddin
Razak, the current Chairman of Muhammadiyah, stated "Muham-
madiyah followers wish to work hard to support Amien Rais in the
competition for president, but Muhammadiyah has to be fifty-fif-
ty".110 In other words, Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi tried to be
politically realistic. For those who preferred to vote for SBY-Kalla,
the door was open, too.
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In playing such a role Muhammadiyah has provided an open and
controllable space for different views in its community. This, in turry
has become an important factor in shaping the Indonesian democra-
tization process. Although the potential of radical puritan elements
remains strong in this organisation, the way its political ijtihad is ex-
ercised shows that such radical elements have become part of a less
determinant factor. The preeminence of PAN over PI(B in the outer
islands, which was supported by the network of Muhammadiyah, is
the result of a political trade-off from Muhammadiyah followers who
have enjoyed services from the social and religious institutions of
this organisation. The mixture of religious, political and rational jus-
tification provided by Muhammadiyah leaders reflects the way dem-
ocratic values should be appropriated in Indonesia. By using such a
mixture, then, objectively speaking, Muhammadiyah has successfr-rlly
persuaded their follower to remain loyal to their organisation and
leaders, even though it is not a traditional loyalty in nature. Where
Muhammadiyah, and accordingly, PAN, has failed is in its attempt to
attract Indonesians from outside their ovrn community in order to
support their religious-political mission which is based on its reli-
gious worldview, which is "commanding right and forbidding
wrong."
Conclusion
This study set out to examine whether loyalty and affiliation to
religious (Islamic) organisations will matter for the implementation
of democratic values, such as freedom of expression and political
choice. Following the discussion of the original bases of Muhammad-
iyah as voluntary organisation by pointing out that it been based on
ijtihad, the study has provided examples of how these bases were
implemented when Muhammadiyah established a political party close-
ly associated with it.
Considering all the data presented above, it is fair to conclude
that loyalty and affiliation to Islamic organisations does not hinder
the implementation of democratic values, neither in day-to-day life
nor in specific aspects of procedr-rral democracy, i.e. elections. There
are, however, a few notes that have to be made, As a matter of fact,
affiliation to an Islamic organisation can speed up the process of
democratisation. The loyalty and affiliation of modernist-puritanical
Muslims to Muhammadiyah are generally for religious understand-
ings and rituals. L:r the three provinces that were scrutinized for this
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study, this loyalty on religious grounds has translated into different
degrees of loyalty to the political parties that were established with
the endorsement of the national leaderships of the two organiza-
tions. The political loyalty of Muhammadiyah supporters toward PAN
and its politicians as well as for Amien Rais during the presidential
election was mostly justified in accordance with the principles of de-
mocracy. Muhammadiyah followers were free to make their own
judgment as to how the relation between PAN and Muhammadiyah
should be understood. However, the religious worldview of Mu-
hammadiyah has significantly contributed to the way they see the
relation between the two. Yet, in the end, it was their freedom that
determined their political choices.
In regard to the question as to how Muhammadiyah participated
in the ongoing process of democratisation in Indonesia, this study
has shown that Muhammadiyah has implemented what this study
termed as the intermediary orgnnisation pattern and the intermediary or-
ganisntions political parties pattern. In other words, Muhammadiyah was
playing two roles simultaneously. As for the intermediary organisation
pattern,Muhammadiyah has participated in advancing the understand-
ing of their followers of how they should participate democratically
during the election.
However, due to the different bases of their trajectory of political
participation 
- 
ijtihad-based political participation of Muhammad-
iyah and ijma.based political participation of NU 
- 
the goals to be
achieved through their political participation were different. For
Muhammadiyah, success in the parliamentary and presidential elec-
tion was equivalent to success for PAN as the political vehicle of Amien
Rais and for Amien Rais himself as a presidential candidate. General-
ly speaking, by using the political ijtihnd participation, Muhammad-
iyah was successful in uniting the Muhammadiyah followers without
any meaningful suppression to vote for PAN and Amien Rais, with
only a minor exception in South Sulawesi. However, by the same
token, Muhammadiyah failed to attract voters from outside the Mu-
hammadiyah community. Voters other than those affiliated with
Muhammadiyah were regarded to be politically and religiously in-
correct. Those who were accused of their incorrectness could hardly
be persuaded of the values if political ijtihad and were naturally re-
luctant to support political stance of Muhammadiyah politicians.
As for the intermediary organisations political party pattetn, Muham-
madiyah allowed its networks to be dedicated to the basis of their
foundation and as the main sources of leadership recruitment for
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PAN and Muhammadiyah respectively. As such, they were success-
ful in maintaining their independence from a party even though they
allowed different views to exist. The limited number of leadership
positions in Muhammadiyah board in any level can now be allocated
through the existence of political parties associated with it. It has to
be acknowledged, however, that the question of how the elected
politicians of PAN have contributed to the ongoing process of democra-
tisation in the regional houses of parliaments in the outer islands can
be an object of ftirther studies.
Despite the success of Muhammadiyah in advancing the aura of
democracy in Indonesia, the way each implements democratic values
causes a dilemma in the short term. This can be seen from the failure
of the top leaders of Muhammadiyah (Amien Rais) to become presi-
dent to be the President. The dilemma for Muhammadiyah lies in the
problem related to its strict reference to the notion of ijtihnd political
participation coupled with puritanical Islam. \Mhile the influence of
the Muhammadiyah worldview on Amien Rais's view of national
social and political problems might be ideal, it tends to be less attrac-
tive to voters other than Muhammadiyah followers. Lacking an an-
ticipation of the contemporary challenge of democratic competition
is the real main cause of its falilr-rre in the presidential competition.
Thus, Muhammadiyah has to learn to be more persuasive, flexible
and moderate to attract more supporters from outside established
Muhammadiyah circles.
Muhammadiyah was originally established for promoting the
importance of ijtihad and to be an agent of change for Muslims' un-
derstanding toward their religion. Several decades after its estab-
lishment, the organization has moved beyond its religious bound-
aries and is now an influential political actor. This kind of develop-
ment is inevitable by nature. Sr-rch political influence is a by-product
of its religious worldview and the steady expansion of its amal usaha
(charity and financial institutions), as elucidated earlier. Mr-rhammad-
iyah is no longer just a religior-rs organisatiory but also a political force.
Even though it has never been a political part!, its role in Indonesian
socio-politics is crucial to be considered for the future of Indonesian
democracy. Its amril usaha, which is free from government interfer-
ence, exists across the archipelago and has become the strongest con-
tributors in developing human resources and maintaining bonds be-
tween Muslims across the country. There is no doubt that the alumni
of its education and training programs form a substantial pool of
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human resources which can help to balance the power of the state
and radical elements within the Muslim community.
Political participation of Muhammadiyah after the collapse of the
New Order was mainly focused on the implementation of political
ijtihad of Amien Rais through the establishment of PAN. Although
there were debates over the relation between PAN, Muhammadiyah
and Amien Rais, the endorsement of the Central Board of Mtfiam-
madiyah toward the political ijtkad of Amien Rais made the relation
between them politically well-built.
While many other observers have probably come to the same con-
clusion in regards to the roles of Muhammadiyah in Indonesian pol-
itics, my examination of political ijtihnd of Muhammadiyah shows
that Muhammadiyah is not only a social organization,but also a strong
political force, which is imperative for the Process of democratisation
in the country. The formation of the political party by its leaders can
be seen as a political wing in which its religious understanding can be
implemented on a broader scale.
In a pluralist society like Indonesia, the ongoing participation of
Muhammadiyah as intermediary organisation is crucial in support-
ing the process of democratisation. Despite the fact that Muslims com-
prise nearly 90 percent, the country rs de facto a pluralist sociefy. How-
ever, the majoritarian democracy which is based on religious belief
and thereby can cause vuinerability for minority groups, will not
have potential. Therefore, the consensual democracy which is em-
bedded in the political participation of NU as I discussed in my other
paper can be promoted and maintained. Muhammadiyah might want
to learn from this fellow organization.
This study has demonstrated that the future trajectory of democ-
racy in the outer islands is more promising. The political behavior of
Muslims in the outer islands is not inflr-renced by fanaticism or irra-
tional loyalty toward their affiliated organization, but rather the sit-
uational logic which benefits the community as a whole.
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Studit Islamika, Vol. 15, No. 1,2008
Iltihad Based Politics
"... the mujahid (one who carries out jihad) is he who strives against him-
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don: The Johns Hopkins University Press, L988, and Guillermo O'Donnell
and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentatiae
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31. By the time he criticized Rais (1999) Harun was a member of the DPR for
Golkar, the former regime party of the New Order government. He also
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33. This was Rais's response to Hisanori Kato, when the latter asked him "Did
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Jewish, and anti-Christian.
34. This historic meeting was later known in PAN circles as pertemuan Sirna-
galih (Sirnagaiih meeting). See for example A.M. Fatwa, op, cit., and Mu-
hammad Nadjib, "Sejarah Partai Amanat Nasional dan Peran Amien Rais,"
available at <http: / / www.amanatnasional.net/tiki-index.php>, access-
ed on 17 April 2006).
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37. Fatwa, PAN Menyongyong Era, p.24.
38. Robert W. Hefner, Ciail Islam: Muslims and Democratizntion in Indonesin.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
39. Merle Ricklefs, "Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore's
Giant Neighbor," Public Lecture, presented at the Asia Research Institute,
National University of Singapore Asian/Civilizations Museum, 23 Sep-
tember 2004.
This part is a summary of an interview between the author and Alwi
Yuddin, 27 March2004.
Interview with the author in Banjarmasin, 23 March 2004.
Interview with the author, 27 March 2004.
Interview with the author, 29 March 2004.
rbid.
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rbid.
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rbid.
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membership see Achmad Musyidi, Profile Anggotn Muhammadiyah lProfile
of Muhammadiyah Membershipsl, Yogyakarta: LP3-UNry, 2000 and Mit-
suo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises oaer the Banqan Tree, Yogyakarta: Gad-
jah Mada University Press, 1983, pp.117-126.
52. See section 2 for the details of this.
53. Interview with the author, 23 March 2004.
54. Interview with the author, 23 March 2004.
55. Robert Hefner, Ciail Islam: Muslims and Demoqatization in Indonesia. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 20.
Risnal Mawardi, interview with the author, 27 June 2006.
My deepest thanks to Mr. Risnal Mawardi for providing me with copies
of some of the documents relating to the formation of PAN in Jambi.
Risnal Mawardi, Interview with the author, 27 June 2006.
Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesian Civil-Military Relations: The Armed Forc-
es and Political Islam in Transition, 1997-2004, PhD Thesis, 2004, p.234.
There is no statistic available on this. However, in most centers of busi-
nesses in every regency and the city of Jambi we can see clearly how
Minangkabau people dominates. Most of the time, even the language
used in trading communication is the Minangkabau dialect. One good
example of this is in the Center of Pasar Tanah Pilih, in the jambi city.
See related section on the history of the formation of Muhammadiyah injambi and the significant role of Minangkabau traders.
There are two individuals with the names of Muhammad Ramli in Mu-
hammadiyah South Kalimantan, one who held the position of chairman
of Muhammadiyah of South Kalimantan, the other the chairman of the
Dnkwah section. In order to distinguish between the two, I will refer to the
chairperson of Dakzuah as Muhammad Ramli, MA.
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63. In this context "realpolitik" simply means politics as a way of struggling
for power, such as through a political party, while "moralpolitik" means
politics for promoting the advance of morality without having to be in-
volved in a political party. This notion is inspired by Eric Langenbacher's
articie "Moralpoliiik versus Moralpolitik: Recent Struggles over the Con-
struction of Cultural Memory in Germany" ln German Politics and Society,
23.3 (Fall 2005) p. 106-135. I am using the title of this article as found in the
journal, although the author might well mean 'Moralpolitik versus Real-
politik', as can be found in one section of his article.
64. Zulktfh Nurdin, Interview with the author, 15 March 2004.
65. Muhammad Ramli later found his own way by running for DPD the (Re-
gional Representative Council) seat, which was included in PP No. 12
1999, Ramli convincingly won the position to represent South Kaliman-
tan. See W aj ah D P R dsn D PD 2004-2009. Kompas, Jakarta: 2005, p. 689.
66. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
67 . Adijani did not elaborate further as to what kind of commitment they had
agreed upon such that followers of Muhammadiyah have to vote for po-
litical parties other than PAN. It might be due to one of the verses in the
Qur'an that says "O YOU who have attained to faith! Do not take the jews
and the Christians for vour allies: thev are but allies of one another and
whoever of you allies irimself with them becomes, verily, one of them;
behold, God does not guide such eviidoers" (Q 5:51). Interview with the
author, 24 March 2004 tn Banjarmasin.
68. Interview with the author, 1.4March2004.
69. "Kader terbaik" is often used interchangeably with "putra terbaik." How-
ever, there is a difference of emphasis. "Kader terbaik" refers to the expe-
rience and organisational career gained through Muhammadiyah that
makes one the best man. "Putra terbaik" refers in both the professional
context and the family lineage context to a man who comes from the
keluarga besar of Muhammadiyah. This interpretation can be drawn from
arguments that have appeared in the debates on the issue.
70. Sudar Siandes (ed), Mrlhammadiyah: Eksperimen Politik dalam Pemilu Presiden
2004 [Muhammadiyah: Political Experiment in Presidential Election 2004],jakarta: Rineka Cipta,2004, p.9
71. See appendix II: Sample of "Catatan Pokok Calon Pimpinan Muhammad-
iyah."
72. Interview with Asnawi Mukti 28-03-2005.
73. t.e., from the use of the term putra terbaik, everyone will assume that it
refers specifically to Amien Rais.
7 4. See Komp as, 1 6 December 199 6: http : / / www.kompa s.corn / 9 612 / 16 / P OLI-
TIK/muha.htm. During this period, Amien Rais played an important role
in creating and promoting the issue oI suksesi (succession), a campaign to
urge Soeharto to step down as president. For more on Amien Rais's role
on this from a perspective internal to Muhammadiyah, see Muhammad
Najib and Kuat Sukardiyono (eds), Amien Rais sang demokrat : dilengkapi
catatan harian sampai jatuhnya Soeharto, Jakarta : Gema Insani, 1998.
75. See Kompas,16 December 1996.
76. The second issue resulted in the changing of ART Muhammadiyah article
8 to "Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah dipimpin oleh laki-laki dan perem-
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puan," from the previous version which statesd"Persyarikatan Muham-
madiyah dipimpin oleh laki-laki."
77. Kornpas,2S January 2002.
78. Kompas, 2Slanuary 2002.
79. Muhammad Najib and Kuat Sukardiyono (eds), Amien Rais sang demo-
crat. p. 13.
80. Sudar Siandes (ed), Mahammadiyah: Eksperimen Politik dalam Pemilu Presiden
2004, p. 9.
81. "Mu'thi Pimpin Muhammadiyah, Nama Amien Dipersoalkan" Susra Mer-
deka,l.7luly 2002.
82. "Mu'thi Pimpin Muhammadiyah, Nama Amien Dipersoalkan."
83. This statement can be found in different versions in a number of newspa-
pers and weekly journals but with the same issue, See for example, "Ur-
gensi Amandemen Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah" Pikiran Rakyat,3
February 2003.
84. As noted elsewhere, South Kalimantan is an exception in many respects.
Here, PKB could gain one seat in the 2004 election.
85. See, Suzaina Abdul Kadir, Traditional Islamic Society and the State in Indone-
sia: The Nahdlntul Ulama, Political Accommodation and the Preseraation of Au-
tonomy. PhD Thesis, The University of Wisconsin, 1,999, Robin Bush, Islcru
and Cioil Society in Indonesis: The Case of the Nahdlatul Ulama. PhD Thesis,
University of Washington, 2002 and Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesant-
ren:The Role of the Kyai inthe Mnintenance of Traditional Islaminlaaa. Arrzona:
Program for Southeast Asian Studies Arizona State University,1999.
86. See "The Decision of Plenary Session of the Central Leadership of Mu-
hammadiyah." My deepest and sincere thanks to Nasaruddin Razak, the
Chairman of Provincial Board of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi who
provided relevant materials for research and invited other leaders of
Muhammadiyah to be interviewed at the Provincial Office of Muham-
madiyah in Makassar. Such an arrangement of interview made it much
easier for me to communicate with them.
87. See "The Decision of Plenary Session of the Central Leadership of Mu-
hammadiyah."
88. See Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintoh), no.2, year 1999 about
government employee who becomes members of political party. Article
VI section A and B states that a civil servant has to withdraw from govern-
ment employee is he chose to be came a member of a political party. As
mentioned elsewhere there were many initiators of PAN and PKB at local
level who had to let others, some of who did not involve in estabiishing
the parties, to run the respective parties due to this regulation.
89. Muhammad Ramli was a candidate of DPD of South Kalimantan during
this interview took place and he won enough support to gain that posi-
tion of the election. Interview with the author, 24 March 2004.
90. Tempo,20 May 2004.
9\. Tempo,20 May 2004.
92. It rs misleading because not all local leaders of Muhammadiyah in the
agreement to state such explicit support for Amien Rais as well as the
using of Muhammadiyah networks.
93. See "Joined Decision of Plenary Assembly of the Muhammadiyah Central
Board and Provincial Boards about Muhammadiyah Policy in Facing The
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2004 Election" appendix I.
94. Muhammad Ramli, interview with the author, 24March2004.
95. "Mr. Ramly, we, Muhammadiyah Youths are ready to declare that we
want to leave PAN." This statement was quoted by Ramly when I was
interviewing him on the same date above. Interestingly, such debates or
internai conflicts within the Muhammadiyah community are rarely cov-
ered by the media. Muhammadiyah leaders or activists are very keen on
keeping internal conflict out of the reach of journalists. There are a num-
ber of other examples of severe fights within Muhammadiyah leader-
ships that are well kept internally.
96. PP Muhammadiyah, 2002, p.3.
97. Interview 24 March 2004.
98. Interview with the author, 23 March 2004. Ramli also gave a further exam-
ple of his commitment to democratic values by acknowledging: "I once
wrestled with my own thought. At that time there were five of us (HMI)
against one from another group in the KPU (NU) and one was to be
elected as the head of the office. Because we did not have the same value
orientation, I did not support them (HM). The one who was elected was
from NU." At a different time, but the same place, I was told by Prof. Dr.
Hafiz Anshary AZ, MA, the Head of KPU South Kalimantan that he was
elected among the majority of those who voted were not from NU back-
ground. Interview with the author, 24March2004.
99. See further below for a discussion of how the political guideline and
responses from local leaders of Muhammadiyah to this guideline influ-
enced the result of the election.
100. Kompas, P et a P ol it ik P emilihan Umum 19 9 9 -200 4, I akarta: Kompas, p. 3.
101. See, Suzaina Abdul Kadir, Traditional Islamic Society and the State in Indone-
sia: The Nshdlatul lflama, Political Accommodation and the Preseraation of Au-
tonomy . PhD Thesis, The University of Wiscons in, 1999, Robin Bush, Islam
and Ciail Society in Indonesia: The Csse of the Nahdlatttl Ulama. PhD Thesis,
University of Washington, 2002 and Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pe-
ssntren: The RoIe of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in laoa'
Arizona: Program for Southeast Asian Studies Arizona State University,
7999.
102. Interviewed with the author 28 March 2004 and 31 March 2004 respec-
tively.
103. Interview with the author, 29 March 2004.
104. Interview with the Author, t5 February 2005.
105. For information about HMI and KAHMI see among others Sidratahta
Mukhtar, HMI dan Kekuasaan: Kaderisasi HMI Dalam Mengisi Struktur Kekua-
saan, Jakarta: Prestasi Pustaka, 2006, Agussalim Sitompul, HMI Dalam
Pandangan Seorang Pendetn: Antara Impian dan Kenyataan, ]akarta: Gunung
Agung, 1982 and Ambia B. Boestam [et al.l, KAHMI, Reformasi, dan
Civil Society, Jakarta: Majelis Nasional KAHMI, 2000.
106. For all this information about jusuf Kalla, visit <http://www'tokohin-
donesia.com/ensiklopedi/j/index.shtml>, accessed on 12 December 2007'
107. See note 318 above.
108. Interview with the author, 24March2004.
109. Interview with the author, 29 March 2004.
110. Interview with the author, 25 March 2004.
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